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THE VESTIGIAL CONSTITUTION: THE
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
RIGHT TO PETITION
Gregory A. Mark*
T UCKED away at the end of the First Amendment, looking to the
modern eye almost like an afterthought, lies the right to "petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." 1 Yet, the history of this
seeming afterthought can tell us more about the evolution of constitu-
tional culture than that of almost any other portion of the Constitu-
tion. Understanding petition's history will unsettle some of our most
comfortable assumptions about modem constitutionalism, as much as
it will give us insights into our evolution as a polity and our relation-
ships with the structure of government.
The history of the right to petition is at once a social, political, and
intellectual story reflected in the narrative of the evolution of a consti-
tutional and legal institution. Understood properly, it tells us about
popular participation in politics, especially by disenfranchised groups
such as women and African-Americans, that has remained invisible
because of our contemporary fixation on voting as the measure of
political participation. At the same time, it reminds us that the partic-
ipation of disenfranchised groups before much of the nineteenth cen-
tury was part and parcel of a different political culture, one marked by
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. J.D., Uni-
versity of Chicago; M.A., Harvard University. I am indebted to numerous individuals
and institutions for their advice and support in preparing this essay. To those who
generously took the time to comment on earlier drafts presented to the Annual Meet-
ing of the Law and Society Association, to the New York University Legal History
Colloquium, and to the Chicago Area Legal Historians, I am grateful. R.B. Bern-
stein, Marcia Blaine, Sherry Colb, Christine Desan, Michael Dorf, Christopher Eis-
gruber, Martin Flaherty, Michael Gerhardt, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Hendrik
Hartog, Felicia Kornbluh, Larry Kramer, William Nelson, John Reid, Stephan Thern-
strom. William Treanor, and James Wilson all read earlier versions of the essay and
went out of their way to provide me with valuable comments and encouragement.
Marcia Blaine, Sarah Gordon, and Philip Hamburger generously shared the fruits of
their own research with me. Presentations of early drafts to the faculties of the
Rutgers Law School-Newark, the Chicago-Kent College of Law, and the Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law also helped me develop this essay. Bae Smith and Elizabeth
Edinger, librarians with great patience and ingenuity, and Selena Castle, Catherine L.
Fletcher, Amy L. Miller, and Jennifer Welch, superb research assistants, all made this
a richer essay. My deepest debt is to the late Emma Lou Thornbrough, a model
historian and staunch civil libertarian, who herself had to fight gender prejudice in
order to practice her craft. She first made me aware of the controversies posed by
petitioning in American history. I am proud to have been her student.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I. The full text of the amendment reads: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people




a strikingly greater degree of hierarchy, deference, and group identity
than we observe in our late twentieth-century polity. The evolution of
petitioning itself is also a story of the transformation of an unmediated
and personal politics into a mass politics. The earlier politics was one
characterized by a willingness of petitioners not just to compile griev-
ances, but also to suggest the remedy for the grievances, even by way
of proposed legislation-and for officials to take such suggestions very
seriously. That unmediated and personal politics was set in the sur-
roundings of governmental institutions that had roles far more flexible
than our contemporary understandings of separation of powers would
countenance-at the behest of petitioners, the legislature adjudicated
complaints and acted as an appellate body, courts perfomed adminis-
trative functions, and the executive issued orders that look to us strik-
ingly legislative, among other things. Making coherent this
combination of hierarchical but unmediated participation in an insti-
tutional setting so foreign to us were assumptions about social order
and theories of representation that were only partially and occasion-
ally articulated before the American Revolution.
The Revolution, the experience of the confederation, and the delib-
erations of the Constitutional Convention and ratification brought to-
gether these disparate strands of politics, social order, and thought.
From the first Congress emerged what is our First Amendment, con-
taining the federal right to petition. The structural constitutional com-
ponent of the right has been eclipsed by the rise of a liberal polity that
has voting as its participatory cornerstone and a nation-state grown so
populous as to render an unmediated politics seemingly impossible, at
least at the national level. Moreover, even from a narrow rights-as-
protection-from-government perspective, where once political speech
had petitioning at its very core, and what we understand as speech and
press stood at the periphery, now the core and periphery are reversed.
Modem doctrine has elevated the protections for speech and press,
while the protection of petitioning has not stayed proportionally
greater; indeed, it has been all but subsumed in the protections of
speech and press.
The story of the right to petition is thus, in many ways, a cautionary
tale. On the one hand, we should be extremely careful about legal
anachronism. Petitioning was a vital element in a political and consti-
tutional culture that is not coming back. Attempts to revivify it-to
make its unmediated politics the hallmark of the constitutional or-
der-would be fraught with both theoretical and practical difficulties.
On the other hand, we should be equally careful about our constitu-
tional teleology, both as a matter of doctrine and interpretation. Cor-
seting the current understanding of petition and assembly in
seventeenth and eighteenth century formalisms would mock our own
politics. Restricting speech and press rights because of a misguided
originalism about the functioning of petitions as the core of political
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speech would be absurd in a culture of pluralism and mass politics-to
do so would be, paradoxically, to stifle the very expression that the
right to petition was meant to protect. Constitutional theorists, in-
cluding members of the judiciary called upon to examine the meaning
of the constitutional text, would do well to remember that the vestiges
of a constitutional culture now past are as much a part of the whole
constitutional text as are today's most meaningful sections. Under-
standing the vestiges tells us a great deal about the fears and aspira-
tions, as well as the blinders, of the Constitution's original authors.
Like the colonists who insisted on replicating the rights of Englishmen
on the continent they were to conquer, we should understand the full
constitutional legacy, vestiges and all, the better not just to adopt, but
to adapt the constitution that a culture not our own bequethed to us.
To say that the right is today moribund is grossly to understate the
case. The Petition Clause, though orginally a central feature of the
relationship between the governed and the government, has never
been a central concern of the American judiciary and today, to the
extent that it is noticed by the courts at all, it has been almost com-
pletely collapsed into the other rights that the First Amendment pro-
tects.2 Moreover, the right to petition in America has received little
serious attention from academics.' If the Supreme Court has rightly
2. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (noting the interrelatedness of all the protections contained within the First
Amendment and concluding that no greater protection attaches to defamatory speech
contained in a petition than is afforded defamatory speech conveyed through other
modes).
The doctrinal history of the right is set out in Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, The
Supreme Court and the First Amendment Right to Petition the Government for a Re-
dress of Grievances, 30 L. Ed. 2d 914 (1973).
One of the few areas in which the right to petition is regularly invoked and has
force paradoxically demonstrates how peripheral it has become to mainstream consti-
tutional discourse. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine in antitrust law holds that the an-
titrust statutes should not be construed to limit associational activity undertaken to
persuade the executive and legislative branches to take actions that might have the
effect of restraining trade or creating a monopoly. See United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
3. For example, the most widely used treatise on constitutional law does not even
discuss the right to petition. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d
ed. 1988). The only mention of this right in Tribe's treatise is in a footnote appended
to the discussion of defamation. Id. at 866 n.31 ("The Court has nonetheless held, not
surprisingly, that the petition clause of the first amendment does not provide absolute
immunity for statements made to government officials about candidates for appointed
federal office." (citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985))). Nowak and Ro-
tunda's hornbook, however, does devote two sections to discussing the history and
legal principles surrounding the right to petition. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Ro-
tunda. Constitutional Law §§ 16.53, 16.54 (5th ed. 1995). Only one of the current
casebooks on constitutional law discusses the right, and then only in the briefest
terms. See William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials 29-32 (2d
ed. 1995) (providing a brief historical discussion of the right to petition, as well as a
short discourse on its relation to the other rights secured by the First Amendment and
their link to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause). Given
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merged the Petition Clause into other constitutional guarantees, how-
ever, we should still question why its historical significance, especially
its significance outside of constitutional litigation, has not been well-
the recent rise in both the theoretical and historical consciousness among some
casebook authors, see, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law (2d
ed. 1991), this failure of coverage is all the more intriguing.
In addition, the law review literature is staggeringly thin. No member of a law
school faculty has written a purely analytic or historical article on the right. Indeed,
only two such articles exist, both historical, one by a non-academic and the other by a
student. See David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance
of the Right of Petition, 9 L. & Hist. Rev. 113 (1991); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A
Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96
Yale LJ. 142 (1986). Frederick's illuminating article is a highly focused piece with a
limited subject matter. Higginson's note is a politically sophisticated and historically
conscious study of the right, though, as his title modestly suggests, it too is a limited
study. These notes have been supplemented by one, extremely brief, historical discus-
sion of the Olive Branch Petition. Alice Tanner Boyer, The "Olive Branch" Petition,
22 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 183 (1953-1954) (outlining the social and political factors in
colonial America that lead to the writing of the Olive Branch Petition, and providing
the complete text and a short analysis of its content). Akhil Amar's discussion of the
right to petition, while not purely historical, sheds light on the history of the right. See
infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. Political scientists and historians, even
legal and constitutional historians, have, with but a few exceptions, not done much
better in exploring the topic, as I will suggest throughout this article. Petitions have
been discovered by social historians, who have mined them for evidence of other so-
cial phenomena. The social historians have, however, contributed nary a word about
the development of petitioning itself or about the evolution of the right.
Finally, a number of other authors have employed the history of the right in arguing
that the Supreme Court has misconstrued its history and therefore has embarked on a
path of error in interpreting the constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun,
Voice in Government" The People, 8 Notre Dame J.L Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 427 (1994)
(arguing that the petition right protects wider participation in government than other
First Amendment rights); Eric Schnapper, "Libelous" Petitions for Redress of Griev-
ances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 Iowa L Rev. 303 (1989) (arguing
that the McDonald Court's historical analysis of the right to petition was incorrect);
Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging.. .". An Analysis of the Neglected,
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L Rev. 1153 (1986) [hereinafter
Smith, Shall Make No Law] (same). Still others, including authors concerned with the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, have sought to explain or to revivify the right in one con-
text or another. See, eg, Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Aniendment Implications of
Professional Real Estate Investors, 51 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 1199 (1994); James E.
Pfander, Sovereign Iminwuity and the Right to Petition. Toward a First Aniendment
Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L Rev. 899
(1997); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a
Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15 (1993)
(arguing that the Supreme Court incorrectly "collapsed" the right to petition into
other First Amendment guarantees); Anita Hodgkiss, Note, Petitioning and the Em-
powerment Theory of Practice, 96 Yale L.J. 569 (1987) (suggesting that lawyers use
petitioning as a vehicle to empower disadvantaged clients); Comment, On Letting tie
Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. Pa. L
Rev. 1515 (1984) (suggesting relaxation of the rules restricting litigation to la%%yers):
Comment, The Right of Petition, 55 W. Va. L. Rev. 275 (1953) (arguing against Mc-
Carthy-era attacks on civil liberties).
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explored.4 Its current desuetude, after all, seems an inappropriate
measure of its importance in a different era.5
Contemporary doctrine notwithstanding, petitioning was at the core
of the constitutional law and politics of the early United States. That
was why it was included in the First Amendment, not as an after-
thought, but rather as its capstone. Petitioning embodied both Revo-
lutionary idealism and a lengthy domestic colonial practice, while
reflecting a widespread understanding about both what the founders
perceived to be the necessary and the best traditions of English consti-
tutionalism, as well as newly-articulated domestic political aspirations
embedded in the Constitution. For the colonists and citizens of the
early republic, petitioning embodied important norms of political par-
ticipation in imperfectly representative political institutions, and
therefore tells us about the political roles of varying elements in
American society of that period. Petitioning was the most important
form of political speech the colonists had known, not just because of
its expressive character, but also because of the ways in which it struc-
tured politics and the processes of government, even as separation of
powers was becoming a reality. For individuals and groups, it was a
mechanism for redress of wrongs that transcended the stringencies of
the courts and could force the government's attention on the claims of
the governed when no other mechanism could. Petition's history is
important, therefore, because it gives us a way to measure the changes
in our constitutional politics and law too often obscured when our his-
torical vision is blindered in service to our own ends. Precisely be-
cause its history is not much contested by those seeking historical
justification for current positions, it is likely to provide as undistorted
a mirror as we can get on our constitutional past.6
4. At least two of the legal commentators concerned with the contemporary rele-
vance of the clause have written explicitly to employ history as a basis for criticizing
the Court's treatment of petitioning and to urge consideration of the petition clause
separately from other First Amendment guarantees. See Schnapper, supra note 3, at
304-05; Smith, Shall Make No Law, supra note 3, at 1180-97. Others are more cau-
tious, suggesting that historical examination "perhaps should spark a reconsideration"
of the merger of the guarantees. Frederick, supra note 3, at 142; see also Higginson,
supra note 3, at 165-66 (criticizing the Court and scholars' inconstancy in maintaining
originalism generally while failing to follow the Framer's intent with regard to peti-
tioning specifically).
5. Eighteenth-century constitutional rights, however, were not twentieth-
century constitutional rights. For example, a right given much emphasis
then-one of the most cherished and utilized that the British people pos-
sessed-was the right of petition. It is so unimportant now that it is seldom
mentioned in treatises on American constitutional law.
John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority
of Rights 4 (1986) [hereinafter Reid, Constitutional History].
6. I do not mean to suggest that historical analysis is objective. See Peter Novick,
That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profes-
sion (1988). Nonetheless, constitutional history is particularly vulnerable to being
bent and historical analysis of a clause of minimal current relevance is least likely to
be subject to such pressure.
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The right to petition has not received the attention it warrants be-
cause those who have taken the time to consider it, either as a consti-
tutional or historical phenomenon, have not understood it as a
political and constitutional institution linked to, but independent of,
speech, press, religion, and even assembly.7 They, thus, failed to ap-
preciate the right of petition's unique significance in a legal, political,
and social structure that was dissimilar, in some ways quite radically
so, from that of the late twentieth, or even the nineteenth, century.'
Other constitutional guarantees, because of their contemporary signif-
icance, today occupy center stage for scholars and advocates seeking
to chronicle or explain their development.9 Thus, the history of the
right to petition is to constitutional and legal history as the history of
alchemy is to the history of chemistry or the history of science."0 That
is, it is a phenomenon of considerable significance to its historical
practitioners, but one that today apparently lacks immediate
relevance.
Petition's historical significance is quite considerable. In this paper,
I argue that the right to petition is a product of, and integral to, the
polity of colonial and early national America. That polity can be char-
acterized as far more corporate and hierarchical and less individualis-
tic in its social and political organization than that of the liberal polity
that has characterized most of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries." Colonial society was characterized to a great extent by its
Recently, Martin Flaherty has reminded the constitutional law community of the
need to be attentive to the breadth and depth of historical scholarship when appropri-
ating evidence from the past. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem Ameri-
can Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995).
7. Other such institutions, especially voting and citizenship, have been studied on
their own terms or as a means by which goals are achieved.
8. Higginson does by far the best job, noting the breadth on the social spectrum
of those who did petition, granting that such participation gave every group a mini-
mum amount of political power, and placing the right in a different historical era.
Higginson, supra note 3, at 144-58. Nonetheless, even while acknowledging the im-
portance of political culture, he minimizes it. Ultimately, Higginson argues that peti-
tioning was "defeat[ed]" in the nineteenth century as a result of two factors-slavery
and the flood of anti-slavery petitions. While he acknowledges changes in the under-
lying political culture, he is not explicit, apart from those two factors, about what
those changes were or precisely how those changes in political culture altered the
environment of the right to petition. See id. at 165-66.
9. See generally Reid, Constitutional History, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining the
phenomenon by noting the transformation of the rights to trial by jury and freedom of
the press).
10. See generally Frances A. Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (1972) (detail-
ing the historical period between the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution).
11. I hesitate to denominate the corporate components of the polity that I believe
characterized the colonial and early national periods as republican for three reasons,
though I think that such characterizations have great merit. First, I believe that aca-
demics these days use the term "republican" to mean two somewhat different, though
perhaps complementary, things. Many modem academic lawyers, prominent among
them Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, and Frank Michelman, use the term to de-
scribe an as yet unachieved political and governmental system in which reasoned de-
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members' conscious and unconscious allegiances to groups, both for-
mally 12 and informally 3 constituted. These groups, in turn, had rec-
ognized,14 though not necessarily formal, 15 status in the political
structure, both in relation to each other and to the state. Moreover,
some groups had greater status than others, though no group was en-
tirely excluded from participation in political matters. Put differently,
every person, to the extent of membership in a group, played out
political roles, even sub silentio.16 The public arena of politics was
not, so conceived, the realm only of the enfranchised, the wealthy, the
white, or the male. Admittedly, of course, well-off white male voters
occupied center stage. Nonetheless, as with the best of Elizabethan
theater, politics contained plays within plays, many acted out off-stage
but important to the center stage. The decline of that society, and the
liberation rather than, for example, interest group politics, defines political conduct.
While I believe that as I shall indicate, there is much in the history of the right to
petition that supports a reasoned deliberation-forcing approach to politics, I am not
comfortable with that as a description of the colonial world because it fails to capture
that era's hierarchical and spiritual aspects. Second, while I am more comfortable
with the way in which historians, especially some legal historians, use the term, I am
not confident that the history of petitioning supports a conception of politics in which
virtue, to put it grandly, or the public good, to put it somewhat less grandly, is put at
the center of political practice. Nonetheless, the history of the right to petition has
elements that support the contention that an elevated conception of the ends of poli-
tics was a mark of colonial society. Finally, republicanism is usually associated only
with the late colonial and Revolutionary periods, and petitions' corporate and hierar-
chical aspects antedate America's republican moment. A brilliant full-blown critique
of the republicanism of legal scholars from a historian's perspective is Laura Kalman,
The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (1996).
12. For example, the colonies had established churches, meaning that they were
state supported. Indeed, even allegiance to one's colony was a hallmark of pre-Revo-
lutionary America.
13. Much of the social history of the past thirty years has been devoted to explor-
ing such identifications and allegiances.
14. The role of the "mob" is a prominent, if controversial, example. Compare
Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolution-
ary America, 25 Win. & Mary Q. 371 (1968), with Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings
and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 Win. & Mary Q. 3 (1970). Wil-
liam Treanor extends the focus directly to the legal system. See William M. Treanor,
The People Against the Government: Essex County, New Jersey, Land Riots, 1745-
1754, and the Restoration of Order (October 16, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author); see also John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob,
the Justifications in Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1043 (1979) (discussing the legality of riots and their place in constitutional
history).
15. The English Parliament, composed of the Lords on one hand and the Com-
mons on the other, was the model for the upper and lower houses of colonial assem-
blies. Those assemblies, however, were but a shadow of England's, quite imperfectly
replicating England in colonial societies whose political and social divisions were
quite different from England's.
16. In very different contexts, this point has been made about slaves and women.
See, e.g., Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordon, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 25-49
(1972) (explaining the legal and political role of slaves in the hegemonic culture of
slave law); Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880
(1990) (discussing women's role in informal politics in the nineteenth century).
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rise of a liberal polity,' 7 gutted petition of its original constitutional
and political meaning and left those persons not directly included in
the liberal enfranchised polity with an even more tenuous toehold in
formal politics than petition had provided.
This article begins by describing the development of the classic peti-
tion, that is, petition as it developed in colonial America. Part I traces
the right to petition and its meaning from its English antecedents
through the colonial experience. Petitioners in this era sought individ-
ual or collective redress of grievances from the government, usually
the colonial assembly. The government, in turn, felt a socio-political
obligation to hear those grievances, to provide a response, and often
to act upon the complaints. To be sure, hearing often meant only re-
ferral to committee; acting, too, without question necessarily did not
mean acting favorably. Nonetheless, the process reflected the serious-
ness of petitions to the constitution of government in colonial
America. Reflecting upon that seriousness, Part I closes with a discus-
sion of petition's significance as an emblem of the Revolution. Part II
discusses the fate of petitioning in the Confederation. It analyzes the
place of petitioning in the Articles of Confederation, as well as in the
newly minted state constitutions. Part II also discusses the ultimate
embodiment of the right to petition in the Constitution via the Bill of
Rights. Part III then challenges the argument that petition disap-
peared in the nineteenth century, arguing that the conventional expla-
nations for the decline of the right and its exercise are misplaced.
Petitioning did not disappear. Its character, however, changed dra-
matically. Distinctions in form and substance grew to distinguish per-
sonal from more general grievances. Consistent with the political
changes wrought by the Revolution and the Constitution, petitions
praying for remedies for the more general grievances ceased to be a
vehicle whereby both the enfranchised and the disenfranchised were
entitled to the ear of and consideration by the government. They
came to be instead a tool of democratic mass politics, useful in creat-
17. Many law professors and some historians have seen a clear political develop-
ment during the founding, in which a republican polity was rapidly displaced by a
liberal one. I join most historians in rejecting so clear a dichotomy. Today, we see
contradictions in thought where participants in the politics of the era saw compatibil-
ity. Similarly, legal academics are more apt to romanticize the era by taking only
what is useful to today's discourse. See Kalman, supra note 11, at 174-76. While it is
true that late colonial society was more organic, and republican, than America in the
late twentieth century, I hope to demonstrate not just that a central political institu-
tion-petition-embodied not only liberal components in an organic era, and vice
versa, but also that each era embodied its own constitutional ironies. For example, to
pick but one irony, in an era (late colonial) in which women were excluded from
voting, they nonetheless could wield power via petition, precisely the power that was
diminished in an era (mid-nineteenth century) in which the franchise was extended-
but not to women. Jan Lewis has written an excellent analysis of the constitutional
status of women between those two periods. See Jan Lewis, "Of Every Age Sex &




ing political dramas and highlighting legislative deadlocks, to the det-
riment of popularly-initiated deliberation on grievances. At the same
time, petition proved to be a political training ground for the disen-
franchised, who learned how to play a role in the new world of mass
electoral politics without the ballot and who sought through that
knowledge to gain the ballot. As petition's socio-political meaning
changed, so did its constitutional status. From its place as a, if not the,
universal form of political participation, which was protected first for
its value in providing information to the sovereign and later as every-
one's entry into political society, petition came to be just another form
of political speech, worthy neither of heightened protection nor even
special analysis. The political force of petitions was thereby trans-
formed. The change in regard for petitions also meant that even a
person or persons petitioning for remediation of a private grievance
or for governmental favor lost the power to force the legislature to
pay heed to the complaint. Private petitions continued to exist, of
course, and continued to have utility for petitioners, sometimes enor-
mous utility. Petitioners could, however, no longer rely on a constitu-
tional politics that mandated legislative attention.
I. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
The American colonies adopted and adapted the right to petition
from petition's English precursors. In that respect, the right to peti-
tion differs little from other colonial forms of law, governance, and
politics.'" Modern petitioning differs in importance so wildly from pe-
tition's importance in the colonial era, however, that its salient fea-
tures have been ignored, misunderstood, or unintentionally
downplayed by modem analysts. 19
In the colonial era, a petition was, in the words of one commenta-
tor, "an affirmative, remedial right which required governmental hear-
18. See generally William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The
Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830, at 8-10 (1975) (intro-
ducing his study of the adoption and adaption of the common law in Massachusetts).
19. Christine Desan is the legal academy's important exception. She places peti-
tioning squarely within her discussion of the evolution of colonial legislatures. Peti-
tioning was part of a governmental scheme in which,
[t]he legislature acted . . .within a context that was supposed to produce
legality as opposed to acts of will, power, or grace. Representatives used
legal categories to recognize public obligations to citizens; rights existed and
had force in the political arena. The assumption that the assembly could
produce legality comported with a culture in which many actors participated
in determining law.
Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in
the Early American Tradition, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1463 (1998). In addition, at
least two historians have identified petitions as key to understanding the legislature's
role in colonial America and its relationship with the electorate. See Alison G. Olson,
Eighteenth-Century Legislatures and Their Constituents, 79 J. Am. Hist. 543 (1992);
Alan Tully, Constituent-Representative Relationships in Early America: The Case of
Pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 11 Can. Hist. J. 139 (1976).
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ing and response." 20 Petitioning was a right enjoyed by all persons
and one which all classes and strata exercised, at least to some degree,
both individually and collectively.21 To miss both the mandatory and
participatory features of the right to petition is to put on modem
blinders, seeing only in enfranchisement the base of political partici-
pation.' Indeed, in a liberal and formally egalitarian society, that
may be a proper understanding. 3 In a society more corporately con-
stituted than ours, in which degrees of difference meant a great deal to
one's political and social status, however, that was not the case.
A. The English Background
Numerous distinguished historians have effectively set out the role
of petitioning in English constitutional history, so far as the evidence
allows. A summary of their findings, doing as little violence to the
texture of English history as possible, is useful, not to demonstrate the
importance of petitioning and the right to petition to the English, but
rather to give as clear a sense as possible of the practice and right the
colonists sought to bring with them.
20. Higginson, supra note 3, at 142 (emphasis omitted). Higginson's use of the
modern legislative term "hearing" may overstate the case. In the colonies, petitions
were received and, so far as we can tell, read and responded to. See infra notes 156-71
and accompanying text. In practice, those "ignored or rejected outright ... were few
in number." Tully, supra note 19, at 146-47.
21. While examples of the use of petitions by persons of the lowest social and
political strata abound, any discussion of their right to petition is complicated by the
terminology used in contemporary legal references. For example, while the Constitu-
tion itself refers to petition as a right "of the people," throughout the colonial and
early national periods commentators often referred to the right as one belonging to a
more limited class, such as "citizens" or "freemen." Without delving too deeply into
the etymology of the terms, or their contemporary significance, political and legal
practice was quite latitudinarian, allowing the widest spectrum of persons to partici-
pate, including those who were neither citizens nor free.
22. One prominent legal historian has claimed that the right to petition was, by
the eighteenth century, exactly what the vote is to the twentieth century. See Reid,
Constitutional History, supra note 5, at 23 ("The right of petition was both specific-
to voice a particular complaint or solicit a particular favor-and general: the right's
chief function was to protect all other rights.").
23. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representa-
tive government." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). The Supreme Court is
not alone in making such political assumptions. Distinguished students of politics
agree. See, e.g., Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest For Inclusion 25
(1991) ("[V]oting is central to our entire system of government. The simple act of
voting is the ground upon which the edifice of elective government rests ultimately.").
Even a study of the multifaceted forms of political participation in modern society
grounds them all on voting. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Citizen Participation in the American Federal System 1 (1979) ("First of all, [citizens]
vote. Voting for officials-both in the nominating and the electoral processes-and on
ballot issues is the fundamental form of citizen participation upon which representa-
tive democracy rests."). The same survey does not even mention petition in its list of
"Forms of Citizen Participation." Id. at 2 fig. 1.
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Chronicling references to redress and petition as far back as possi-
ble in English legal history, that is to Magna Carta and somewhat be-
yond,24 quickly leads to the discovery that requests for a redress of
grievances initially had a tenuous quality and only after centuries of
experience became such a part of English political life that they lay at
the core of English constitutionalism.
1. The Evolution of Petitioning in English Constitutionalism
The practice of petitioning the King for redress long antedated
Magna Carta. 5 In its origins, petitioning was apparently narrow in
application. Although the King regularly provided relief to petition-
ers, he generally did so when it was in his own interests, that is, when
the request coincided with his interests and when the King could ex-
tract something beneficial in return for granting relief.
While the practice's origins and its original significance are murky,
its utility to petitioners was originally as an error-correcting device for
a limited set of grievances.2 6 That is, petitioners usually sought the
King's resolution of a claim already handled by another, lesser author-
ity. Indeed, the earliest codes appear to have required resort to other
tribunals before petitioning the King. Petitioning was thus premised
on a vision of ultimate royal authority and the early codifications are
quite explicit in stating that such relief was available for the benefit of
the monarch, not the claimant. The ability to apply for redress of
grievances was, at least in its earliest stages, clearly not a tool for gen-
eral grievances, much less reform, or even a mechanism for first hear-
ing an individual's grievance, but rather was akin to an appellate
mechanism from the decisions of inferior authorities. 7
Early petitions, that is, petitions prior to Magna Carta, were also
therefore not likely a vehicle that created or reinforced a sense of
political power on the part of the petitioner. They were generally not
a mechanism to assert a right against the state or otherwise to assert
24. See, e.g., Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Con-
stitutional Development and Interpretations 12-15 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Texas Tech University) [hereinafter Smith, The Right to Petition] (tracing the
development of petitioning at least to Edgar the Peaceful during the years 959 to 963
A.D.).
25. See id. at 10-15. The textual summary in this and the following paragraphs and
footnotes dealing with pre-Magna Carta practice and law relies on Smith's review of
primary and secondary sources.
26. The disputes for which petition for redress was possible and which were re-
ferred to in the codifications were disputes about property rights between individuals.
27. The limits on the right to petition that appear to be contained in the early
codifications may not have stopped petitions that both sought original resolution of
disputes by the king or petitions on more general matters. Nor should the codifica-
tions necessarily be taken to reflect a practice of petitioning for limited ends. Indeed,
codifications may have embodied a reaction to petitions seeking original or general




one's autonomy, but instead reinforced royal authority. While
monarchs reigning before the Great Charter had pledged to observe
certain rights and liberties of their subjects, no real methods existed
for checking the King when he trenched on those rights in violation of
his pledge. Magna Carta, thus, "derived its importance ... from its
coincidence as a grant of liberties with the formative period of English
legal development."'  Among those legal developments was the
method whereby the King provided for a check on the exercise of his
power, that is, through the use of petition. Magna Carta provided for
a petition by barons to the King notifying him of his failure to observe
the pledges contained in the Great Charter.29
Magna Carta is, however, hailed as the progenitor of English consti-
tutional liberty because it came to provide a formal check on royal
authority that could be exercised by other segments of English society
as well.3" Nonetheless, Magna Carta hardly produced a democratic or
egalitarian polity. Rather, we know both from the document's lan-
guage and the circumstances under which the barons exacted it from
King John, that the King's pledge to respond to such petitions was
28. J. C. Holt, Magna Carta and Medieval Government 292 (1985) [hereinafter
Holt, Medieval Government].
29. After paragraphs securing the ends sought by the barons, Magna Carta pro-
vides, in part, in paragraph 61,
Since, moreover, we have granted all the aforesaid things for God, for the
reform of our realm and the better settling of the quarrel which has arisen
between us and our barons, wishing these things to be enjoyed fully and
undisturbed in perpetuity, we give and grant them the following security:
namely, that the barons shall choose any twenty-five barons of the realm
they wish, who with all their might are to observe, maintain and cause to be
observed the peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed to
them by this our present charter;, so that if we or our justiciar or our bailiffs
or any of our servants offend against anyone in any way, or transgress any of
the articles of peace or security, and the offence is indicated to four of the
aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall come to us or our justi-
ciar, if we are out of the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice and ask
that we have it redressed without delay.
Manuscript Cii of Magna Carta (1215) (translation from text compiled by C. Bemont,
Chartes des libertes anglaises (1892)), in J. C. Holt, Magna Carta, at 448, 469-71 (2d
ed. 1992) [hereinafter Holt, Magna Carta].
30. A fierce and now decades-old struggle exists among English legal historians
concerning precisely whose liberties were secured by the Charter. On the one hand,
emphasizing passages having to do with the nation, lore has it as securing the rights of
the English nation. See, eg., 1 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England:
In Its Origin and Development 569-72 (5th ed. 1891) (1874). On the other hand,
revisionists note that Magna Carta is, after all, really an agreement between the King
and the nation's elites, especially the barons. See, e.g., Edward Jenks, The Myth of
Magna Carta, 4 Indep. Rev. 260 (1902) (dispelling the myth that Magna Carta repre-
sented the will and power of the people). James Holt, perhaps the Great Charter's
leading historian in our time, sidesteps that debate, rightly noting that the modern
significance of the debate is not about the actual legal effect of the Charter then or
today, though, amazingly, small portions of the text survive as law, see Holt, Magna
Carta, supra note 29, at 1-2, but rather, for both historical and legal reasons, "why it
rather than any other document came to play the role it did." Id. at 21.
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conditioned on the barons' allegiance, and therefore constituted an
acknowledgment of hierarchy and the corporate character of the Eng-
lish polity. By requiring the petitioners to acknowledge the primacy
of the king's authority, even the barons' petitions thus reinforced the
hierarchy of the community to which all belonged. Although the bar-
ons' petitions could force the King's attention, their petitions, much
less those of others, do not, at least from the claimant's point of view,
immediately appear to have contained within themselves the empow-
ering or dignity-enhancing features we today associate with the exer-
cise of liberties. The politics of petitioning was more ambiguous than
that. Precisely because petitions sought the invocation of a power in-
herently greater than that of the petitioner, they humbly acknowl-
edged royal authority even while purporting to draw attention to its
limits.
Following Magna Carta, however, petitions took on greater signifi-
cance than just as a mere tenuous appellate mechanism for resolving
private disputes or as a method for the barons to secure their privi-
leges against the King.31 From the beginning, petitions were a formal
and peaceful way to draw the attention of the King and his counsellors
to grievances.3" Given the difficulty of communicating with the gov-
ernment as well as the limited access to the King and his council, 33
petitions were also the most convenient and the most effective method
of calling attention to a grievance. Petitions, by default, became a
31. A petition could embody a grievance that could be redressed by the King's
favor or some form of administrative act. Petitions could also require judicial action,
which came to be resolved through the royal appointment of triers of petitions from
among the Lords. Many petitions, however, contained grievances requiring remedies
that could only be described as legislative. Thus, when the King convened Parliament
to obtain funds, Parliament conditioned the provision of funds on the granting of
petitions. Thus the King was usually, though not always, left to devise methods to
implement the requested redress. To effect redress, the King and his council often
wrote statutes and those statutes, not surprisingly, were drafted to the advantage of
the king. In 1414, King Henry V agreed not to enact laws contrary to the requests of
the Commons without consent. The Commons, however, did not get into the business
of drafting legislation for public bills as a general matter until the sixteenth century.
See J. Harvey & L. Bather, The British Constitution 23 (4th ed. 1977). Norman
Smith's interesting article thus confuses the claim his source, Harvey and Bather,
makes when he cites it, suggesting, "It was not until the Sixteenth Century that legis-
lation came to be enacted by statute rather than by petition." Smith, Shall Make No
Law, supra note 3, at 1156; see also K. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 12 Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences 98, 98 (1934) ("The ordinary mode of legislation was by statute
made on petition of the Commons. The words petition and bill were used inter-
changeably in legal and common speech down to Tudor times." (citation omitted)).
32. See J.E.A. Jolliffe, The Constitutional History of Medieval England: From the
English Settlement to 1485, at 405 (4th ed. 1961); Smellie, supra note 31, at 98.
33. Quite apart from political distance, physical distance and rudimentary trans-
portation made frequent or regular appearances before the King quite difficult for all
but the most local. Moveover, the King quickly sought to avoid audiences with peti-
tioners and required that petitions be in writing.
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mechanism whereby the King and his counsellors' were informed of
political complaints, asked to review actions of government officials,
and through which individuals and groups suggested changes in poli-
cies.35 That is, individuals and groups petitioned for redress of both
public and private grievances.
For example, in 1301, the King was presented with a Parliamentary
petition based on individual petitions to the king containing eleven
articles concerning the prices of foodstuffs taken by the King's ser-
vants, taxes on various goods, the value of money, delays in justice
resulting from writs of protection, the sale of pardons, illegal constab-
ulary jurisdiction, jurisdiction of royal officers, improper escheatments
by the King's officers, and inadequate mechanisms to handle petitions
to the King in Parliament.36 These grievances, reflecting concerns
over the economy, the responsiveness of government, the administra-
tion of both judicial and executive matters, and the extent of govern-
ment officers' authority, all addressed to the King via Parliamentary
petition, suggest that early English jurisprudential consciousness did
not reflect a belief that different fora or methods of resolution were
either necessary or appropriate for each category of grievance.37 The
petitions did not recognize fine a priori distinctions in categories of
judicial, legislative, or executive authority, nor did they recognize a
34. Hannah Pitkin, in her classic work on representation, has suggested that the
King's council was key because "attendance at Parliament was a chore and a duty,
reluctantly performed." Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 3
(1967) (footnote omitted). Moreover, Parliament itself did not begin to have peti-
tions addressed to it until the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century.
35. Raymond C. Bailey, Popular Influence Upon Public Policy: Petitioning in
Eighteenth-Century Virginia 9-10 (1979); Smellie, supra note 31, at 98.
36. See 2 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England: In Its Origin
and Development 338-39 (4th ed. 1896) (1876).
37. See Smellie, supra note 31, at 98. Parliament's rising power, a result of its
control over taxation, gave it leverage in bringing any matter contained in a petition
to the attention of the King and his counsellors and making those matters the subject
of legislation. Moreover, because petitions, even individual petitions reflecting per-
sonal grievances, served as the basis for much legislation of general significance, see
Bailey, supra note 35, at 10-12; Smith, The Right to Petition, supra note 24, at 21-30,
distinctions between what appear to be public and what appear to be private concerns
should not be treated as clear indications that a grievance was public or private in the
modem sense.
The single exception appears to be a narrow judicial one. When the king appointed
a trier of a petition, the trier would often refer the petition to the appropriate court if
law existed to handle the complaint. Petitioners, however, were able to circumvent
even that exception by addressing their petitions to the Commons rather than the
King. So quickly did the private bill in the Commons supersede the judicial role of
the Lords that, by the seventeenth century, "[the House of Lords] had not been re-
quired to exercise that authority for almost 300 years." James S. Hart, Justice Upon
Petition: The House of Lords and the Reformation of Justice 1621-1675, at 2 (1991).
Ironically, in 1621, the Lords-on the basis of petitions-began again to exercise their
"broad[ ] legal authority.., to act as the court of last resort for any party who had
been victimized by failings in the legal system." Id.
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deep theoretical gulf between public and private grievances. 38 A re-
quest from an individual or a community, for example, could be han-
dled either administratively or through a statute.39 Indeed, even the
distinction between judicial and legislative matters could be quite
opaque. After the accession of Henry IV, individuals often sought
what would become known as private bills from the Commons, Parlia-
ment generally, or the king in council rather than turn to the King to
appoint a trier from the Lords to resolve a grievance.40 The evolution
of the English system for handling petitions thus suggests caution in
reading back into the colonial understanding any a priori conception
of separation of powers, much less modern visions about the public/
private distinction or the roles of any given governmental mechanism
for handling a given grievance.4'
Not only did petitions reflect a wide range of grievances, they
quickly came to dominate Parliament's calendar-indeed, they often
became the legislative agenda.42 Moreover, Parliament, especially the
House of Commons, became ever more central to the operation of
English government, and petitions were central to Parliament's ac-
cumulation of power. Ultimately, to act, the King had to rely on Par-
liament to provide him with funds. Parliament would not act on the
King's request for funds until the King agreed to redress the griev-
ances contained in petitions he had received 43 or, after the beginning
of the fifteenth century, that the House of Commons forwarded to
him.44 Parliament thus had an interest in considering all petitions be-
38. Nor should this be surprising. Separation of powers is a difficult subject which
remains at the core of American jurisprudence and politics today. See, e.g., Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (finding that the Ethics and Government Act of
1978 did not violate separation of powers). As for the public/private distinction, it is a
product of later eras in which the private realm became one in which the use of gov-
ernmental power became suspect. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/
Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1423-24 (1982). In this essay, "public"
means "general interest" and "private" means "personal interest." I am, of course,
aware that "general interest" legislation is often, some would say always, motivated
by private interests. I mean here only a general/specific dichotomy, though I recog-
nize the importance of the debate about the meaning of "general interest" legislation.
39. See 2 Stubbs, supra note 36, at 426-27.
40. Smellie, supra note 31, at 98.
41. Although Smellie notes that "public petitions for a change in the general law"
appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, petitions for changes in the gen-
eral law that were not public-that is, not aired to the public, or, as he later puts it, "a
method of propaganda"-had been "[t]he ordinary mode of legislation" since Magna
Carta. Id.
42. See, e.g., 2 Stubbs, supra note 36, at 603 ("[Tlhe commons make it a part of
their business to see that the private petitions are duly considered .... "); Smellie,
supra note 31, at 98. Parliament's responsiveness no doubt encouraged further peti-
tioning. Eventually the House of Commons, which had become the receiver of most
petitions, either receiving them directly or on referral from the monarch, instituted
processes for considerng petitions in committee or referring them to the courts. Smel-
lie, supra note 31, at 98; see also Bailey, supra note 35, at 11-12.




cause any given grievance could ground an attempt to increase Parlia-
ment's power at the expense of royal authority.
Parliament's interest in noticing all petitions quite quickly evolved
into both a sense of obligation on the part of Parliament to consider
all petitions and a corresponding sense of right to be heard on the part
of petitioners.45 While at first glance the sense of obligation on Parlia-
ment's part appears to be the most unusual feature of petitions, it can
be explained in part by the quasi-judicial origins of the instrument4 6
and the quasi-judicial role of Parliament. That is, a petition addressed
to the King for redress of a grievance that had the quality of a dispute
was handled by a trier selected from the Lords.47 As that system came
to be disfavored-no doubt because the trier would usually refer the
dispute to a court where the petitioner could have gone anyway-peti-
tioners sought private bills in the Commons.48 Because the petitioner
ultimately chose the forum-such as the King, the Commons, or the
courts-to which he addressed his petition, to the extent that each
forum guarded its power, each would act to receive the petition. Thus,
because it had little incentive to refuse to hear a petition, in practice,
Parliament had little discretion. Also, because petitions for general or
public grievances took the same form as petitions for grievances that
could be resolved by private bill, and because no mechanism existed
to separate one from the other, they were treated in a similar
fashion.49
While the King and his counsellors had, of course, treated petitions
as a matter to be handled with monarchical discretion, even a petition
with a complaint that was never acted upon or was rejected had to be
read. It is not surprising, therefore, that subjects came to expect that
their petitions would be received and heard. 0 Nonetheless, mechani-
45. See Reid, Constitutional History, supra note 5, at 22.
46. Colin Leys, Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 3 Pol. Stud.
45, 49 (1955) ("It is clear that originally petitioning was a quasi-judicial institution.").
47. For the precise workings of the triers, including their capacity to refer a peti-
tion to Parliament, see 3 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England: In
Its Origin and Development 469 (5th ed. 1898) (1878).
48. The practice of selecting triers "lingered until 1886." Smellie, supra note 31, at
98.
49. As early as the fourteenth century, the Commons asserted the power to hear
any petition that required a "change of law." Smellie, supra note 31, at 98; see also 3
Stubbs, supra note 47, at 478 (noting the House of Commons's practice of hearing
propositions for a change of law from a private party, a member of the House, or a
general petition to the House); cf supra note 30 (noting King Henry V's 1414 agree-
ment not to exact laws contrary to petitions without the Commons's consent). Expan-
sively understood, of course, that assertion of power left the Commons free to hear
virtually any petition, as even private bills changed the law. The Commons appar-
ently did not, however, use petitions that were referred to the courts as a basis for
withholding an appropriation of funds. See 2 Stubbs, supra note 36, at 603.
50. Petitioners, of course, had to choose the forum they thought most likely to
hear and act favorably upon their prayer. They could thus exploit the tendency of the
king and Parliament jealously to guard their respective powers. Where no clear de-
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cal explanations, such as the quasi-judicial character of the petitions
and formal similarity of public and private grievances, and even the
use of petitions by one governmental entity to leverage power from
other organs of government, may, however, obscure other subtler ex-
planations for the importance of petitions and the right to petition
buried deeper in English political and legal culture.
Petitioning came to be regarded as part of the Constitution, that
fabric of political customs which defined English rights. 1 That is, by
its use, petition came to be such a clear part of English political life
that, certainly by the seventeenth century, monarchical challenge to a
petition could be, and was, defended on the basis that petitioning was
an ancient right. 2 Petitioning became part of the regular political life
of the English, not just because it was conducive to the interests of
petitioners, and not just because it provided a foundation for Parlia-
ment, especially the Commons, to assert its own expanding legislative
powers. It was also a mechanism that bound the English together in a
web of mutual obligation and acknowledgment of certain commonali-
ties. Its structure reflected an element of reciprocal obligation, em-
bodying the recognition of hierarchy both in that every petition was a
prayer to authority for the grace of assistance as well as an implicit
acknowledgment by the petitioner that the King, ultimately the King
in Parliament, had authority-that is, legitimate power-to resolve
the complaint. In accepting the petition, the King, in turn, acknowl-
edged a duty to subjects, one that had come to mean both hearing the
complaint and not exercising power in an arbitrary fashion. 3
The sense of reciprocal duties had a profound meaning for English
politics. Because petitions became the basis for much legislation and
because petitions were the vehicle for the expression of grievances
with both public and private characteristics, they were a mechanism,
indeed the formal mechanism, whereby the disenfranchised joined the
enfranchised in participating in English political life. 4 In the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries, for example, an extremely wide band
of English society participated in politics by petitioning for redress of
lineation of authority existed, as was often the case, petitioners could choose to ad-
dress their petition to the most favorable authority.
51. James Wilson, relying on English constitutional law, has identified such prac-
tices as "conventions" and persuasively suggests that, especially outside the realm of
what is judicially cognizable, such an understanding also informs American constitu-
tionalism. James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Un-
enforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to
Regulate Political Behavior, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 645 (1992). The legislative use of peti-
tions follows Wilson's analytic pattern.
52. See Smith, The Right to Petition, supra note 24, at 29-38.
53. The Petition of Right in 1628, for example, a Parliamentary petition assented
to by the King in the form in which assent was given to private bills, affirmed that the
King acknowledged the primacy of law. See Smellie, supra note 31, at 99.




grievances, without question a wider spectrum of society than that
with the franchise. Moreover, petitioners acted not just individually,
but collectively, defining themselves as members of a collectivity and
seeking redress for that community of interests. For example, peti-
tioners defined themselves by class, e.g., those petitions signed solely
by members of the nobility; by occupation, e.g., those petitions expres-
sing the grievances of merchants or scholars; by community, e.g., those
petitions sent from cities and shires; and in other ways clearly collec-
tive.5" A petition from a group of prisoners, for example, suggests a
participatory consciousness that extended well beyond even that
which underlies some quite modern concepts of enfranchisement.
The political participation suggested by petitioning is, obviously, of
a different order than is voting in a liberal society, for petitioning was
based on a reciprocity of obligation and, as I have noted, an acknowl-
edgement of a hierarchy extending beyond the structure inherent in
any prayer for assistance, such as a modern civil lawsuit. Its hierarchi-
cal component is also evident from more than just the language of
supplication that introduces each petition, for such prefatory language
has also long been characteristic of lawsuits. More telling is the right,
albeit a limited one, that the monarch and Parliament arrogated to
themselves to reject petitions based on the language of the petition.
That is, if the petition was phrased in terms disrespectful of authority,
it could be rejected without consideration. 56 Rather than genuine def-
erence, however, individuals and groups may have exercised self-cen-
sorship in both the subject matter and language of their petitions to
ensure that their petitions were heard. Separating genuine deference
from self-censorship, especially when both forces may have been at
work simultaneously, is an enormously difficult, if not an impossible,
task. Virtually everyone, however, had the right to petition. At some
point or another, members of virtually every stratum of society exer-
cised the right on a wide variety of topics, however humbly phrased
their entreaties. Because phrasings, however humble, are designed to
attract attention to a petition's substance, they also necessarily invite
attention to a more elementary inquiry: what phrasings were neces-
sary to constitute and create a petition at all.
2. The Definition of a Petition
The seventeenth century, which witnessed numerous upheavals in
English politics, including, of course, civil war, is key to understanding
the centrality of petitioning in English constitutional thought. The
century's upheavals included powerful and unfavorable responses to
55. See George L. Haskins, The Growth of English Representative Government
16 (1948); A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament 42, 117 (2d ed. 1926).
56. See Smith, The Right to Petition, supra note 24, at 43 ("In fact, whenever a




certain petitions, including prosecutions for seditious libel among
those unfavorable responses. In general, those reactions did not ulti-
mately result in an impingement on the right to petition. Indeed, the
reactions generally strengthened the right, especially insofar as peti-
tioners' immunities were refined. What the cases also did, however,
was to bring into sharp definition what a petition actually was. Of the
cases, none is more instructive than that of the Trial of the Seven Bish-
ops in 1688." 7
In 1687, James II, a Catholic, issued a Declaration of Indulgence,
styled as a "Declaration to all his loving subjects for Liberty of Con-
science," which provided for freedom of worship.58 James com-
manded that all clergy read and distribute copies of the Declaration in
their churches.59 The Archbishop of Canterbury and six other bishops
then petitioned the King, asking to be excused from the duty.60 The
seven were arrested, charged with publishing a seditious libel.
One modern commentator, arguing that the Supreme Court has
misunderstood the history of the right to petition, has explored the
intricacies of the case to examine not just how well the right was se-
cured by English courts, but also to tease out assumptions about what
constituted publication of the libelous petition6' and why the Crown
might have valued the information contained in petitions. 62 Those is-
sues are, obviously, of historical import and provide modern constitu-
tional discussants with ammunition in arguing what the extent of the
right might be.63 They do not, however, answer the question of what a
petition actually was.'
A petition was not just any form of communication addressed to the
King, his officers, or Parliament. Rather, it was a communication
which, to be protected, had to take a certain form and embody certain
components. The Bishops' counsel wanted to ensure that the jury un-
derstood that the document containing the alleged libel was a petition
and not a "pretended petition, 65 that is, simply a document advanc-
57. 12 Howell State Trials 183 (1688).
58. The Declaration was read in Latin in court and reproduced in English in the
reporter. Id. at 231-36.
59. The order is also part of the trial record. Id. at 237-39.
60. The petition itself is reproduced in the trial record. Id. at 318-19. The transla-
tion, with a minor omission, is reprinted in The Case of the Seven Bishops (1688).
Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from A.D. 600
to the Present 583, 583-84 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds. &
trans., 1937).
61. See Schnapper, supra note 3, at 312-29.
62. Id. at 319-20.
63. Ultimately, the case simply strengthens the compilation of evidence drawn
from other sources.
64. Without discussing what, precisely, made a document a petition and why, the
commentator, Eric Schnapper, rightly assumed that the document in The Case of the
Seven Bishops was a petition, id. at 316, and thus protected, whereas speech, even
political speech, would have remained unprotected. Id. at 318.
65. 12 Howell State Trials at 321 (argument of Pollexfen).
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ing a libel under subterfuge. The very argument, then, suggests that
not all communications, nor just any document, could be regarded as a
petition.
Other counsel sought to expand on the distinction between peti-
tions and other communication, advancing somewhat formalist dis-
tinctions. Merely reading the information which contained only the
allegedly libelous portions of a petition without reading the whole pe-
tition, they argued, obviated the entire defense that the form of com-
munication was privileged:
[Tihis information and petition do not agree; for they have brought
an information, and set forth, that my lords the bishops, under pre-
tence of a petition, did make a libel, and they have set forth no
petition at all; all the petitionary part is omitted. If I will take part of
a man's words, and not the whole, and make a libel of that part,
certainly that is very disingenuous and injurious: for that part that I
omit may alter the sense of the whole. They here ought to set forth
the petition, with the direction to the king, and the prayer at the
end, whereby it will appear what the whole is, and, what was desired
by their petition. 66
The assertion that the "direction" and the "prayer" made a document
"petitionary," however, was the subject of heated debate. 7
On behalf of the bishops, Sir Robert Sawyer argued that, at a mini-
mum, a petition required a "head" and a "tail," that is 'Ja] direction to
[a] body" and a "prayer."'  Or, as other counsel suggested, without
"both top and bottom" a document "is called a pretended Petition." 69
The Attorney General, seeking to avoid the issue of petition's privi-
leged status, argued that for purposes of a libel action only the
libelous portion was material.70 The Solicitor General, apparently
more confident that the prohibition on seditious libel made irrelevant
which kind of document contained the libel, argued that point at
length:
[I]f it be as the information says, then it is not the speaking of ill
things in the body of a petition, and then giving it the good title of a
petition, and concluding it with a good prayer. 'Tis not, I say, any of
these that will sweeten this crime, or will alter or alleviate it ....
66. Id. at 320 (argument of Levinz, Serj.) (emphasis added).
67. Id
68. Id. (argument of Sawyer); see also id. at 318 ("Read the whole petition ....
Read the top first, Sir, to whom it was directed.").
69. Id. at 321 (argument of Pollexfen); see also id. at 323 (argument of Levinz,
Serj.) ("It is quite another thing ... by this leaving out a part ...."); id. at 360(argument of Sir Robert Sawyer) (same).
70. Id. at 321 ("Sure these gentlemen have not forgot altogether the practice that
has been so frequent in this court: if there be an information for a libel, is there any
thing more frequent, than only to recite the material part?").
71. Id. at 322.
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Even that argument, however, reinforced an understanding that a pe-
tition had to have certain formal components to be a petition-at least
the "good title" and the "good prayer," a more auspicious phrasing of
"head" and "tail."
The court ultimately agreed with the Bishops' counsel. In final ar-
gument, the members of the court made their position clear. The Re-
corder, Sir Bartholomew Shower, suggested that as "for the form of
this paper, as being a petition, there is no more excuse in that neither:
for every man has as much right to publish a book, or pamphlet, as
they had to present their petition.""2 The response of the bench was
curt: "Pray, good Mr. Recorder, don't compare the writing of a book
to the making of a petition; for it is the birthright of the subject to
petition."73 Justice Powell was no less abrupt: "Mr. Recorder, you
will as soon bring the two poles together, as make this petition to
agree with Johnson's book. They are no more alike than the most
different things you can name."74 And, in his summary to the jury, the
Lord Chief Justice sealed the issue, never once referring to the docu-
ment as anything but a petition.7 5 Before retiring to deliberate, the
jury requested "the papers that have been given in evidence."76 After
having heard that the jury would receive a copy of the information, Sir
Robert Sawyer prayed "they may have the whole petition."77 Assured
by Justice Holloway that they would have it with "the direction and
prayer," bishops' counsel said no more.78 Court adjourned for the
day. M The next morning the jury acquitted the bishops.8"
By the seventeenth century, then, what was a petition? A petition
was a communication that, 1) had to be addressed to an authority such
as the King, 2) had to state a grievance, and, 3) had to pray for relief.81
72. Id. at 419.
73. Id. (Holloway, J.).
74. Id. at 420.
75. Id. at 421-26; accord id. at 426 (Holloway, J.); id. at 426-27 (Powell, J.); see also
id. at 427-28 (Allybone, J.) (not disputing the form, but maintaining the irrelevance of
the form).
76. Id. at 429.




81. Schnapper argues that, based on a hypothetical of bishop's counsel, a petition
need "not rest on, or require the presence of, a prayer for relief; so long as a 'petition'
provided the King with advice or information that might lead to the correction of
'mistaken' government action, the document served an important purpose." Schnap-
per, supra note 3, at 321 (citation omitted). The hypothetical's advice of a bishop to
the King, however, was separate from the right to petition and rested on the duty of
the bishops "as peers of the realm, and bishops of the Church of England" to advise
the King that they "could not comply with his order" because his "declaration was
founded upon that which the parliament declared to be illegal." 12 Howell State 'rials
183, 368 (1688) (argument of Mr. Finch); see also id. at 369-70. Thus, where a bishop
might be protected in giving advice to the King, whether in a petition or not, to be
protected by the petitionary right, the petition must be from one "aggrieved." Id.
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Petitions could be, and were, distinguished from other documents,
even ones that were addressed to someone in authority and that stated
a complaint.82
The rationale was far more than a formalism. A petition was the
beginning of an official action, part of a "course of justice," ' not just a
passing of information, even though the conveying of information to
the proper authority was a powerful justification for petitions., Just as
a claim brought in court required submission in a certain manner, so
did a complaint brought by petition, even if the forms required of peti-
tioners never quite equalled in punctiliousness those required of plain-
tiffs at common law.85
The English colonists thus brought a dual heritage with them. On
the one hand, they understood petitioning as the foundation of politics
and of individual and collective participation in politics, warranting
the highest degree of protection. On the other hand, they also knew
that petitioning incorporated a certain type of constitutional politics
and constitutional structure. It was a structure which replicated and
reinforced a corporate hierarchy and which, while protected in its
bounds, had clear formal bounds that embodied the deference and
formalisms attendant on a relatively hierarchical community.
Whether the heritage would survive, and if so, how it would survive so
far removed from the epicenter of English political life, were among
the constitutional questions facing settlers in America.
B. Petition in the Colonies
The American colonists brought with them English political cul-
ture8 6 and sought to recreate what they perceived as its best features
in their settlements. Their ambitions were tempered, however, by
their fears that they might import aspects of English political life that
they regarded as flawed or irrelevant. The difficulty that the colonists
had in replicating their English political heritage is now well-known.s7
Their aspirations, however, were to create, if not replicate, the most
important liberties of that heritage. The ideological underpinnings,
even of revolutionary America, therefore evolved from the political
82. See, e.g., Lake v. King, 85 Eng. Rep. 137, 139 n.2 (1668-1669) (discussing al-
leged libels in official reports and letters).
83. Id. at 140 (referring to a petition to a Committee of Parliament).
84. Cf. Hare v. Millows (1586-1587), reprinted and translated in Select Cases on
Defamation to 1600, at 84 (R.H. Helmholz ed., 1985) (holding that slander in a peti-
tion to the Queen is not actionable "unless it is published before it is delivered").
85. Cf. Lake v. King, 86 Eng. Rep. 729, 729 (1670) ("[If a man make a complaint
in a legal way, no action lieth against him for taking that course ....").
86. See Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center. Constitutional Development in
the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States. 1607-1788, at 22-23
(1986).
87. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 3-
90 (1969) [hereinafter Wood, Creation].
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structure that preceded it.88 The history of petition is emblematic of
the complexity of that evolution.
1. Participation-The Law
Colonial experience appears not only to have replicated England's
widespread use of the petition, it likely extended it in both law and
practice.89 Not only did the colonies explicitly or implicitly affirm the
right to petition, they did so repeatedly.9" In no case did the colonial
affirmation of the right narrow the English right.91 The language of
letters patent and similar instruments authorizing the establishment of
colonies usually granted colonists the rights of Englishmen.9
88. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1016, 1018 (1988) (reviewing Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously
(1987)) ("While the revolutionary era witnessed a new concern with individual rights
and a greater acceptance of the value of commerce, older notions of communitarian-
ism, of public good, and of civic obligation remained powerful.").
89. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 35, at 41 ("[A] survey of the petitions presented to
the [Virginia] legislature both before and after Independence reveals that all classes
utilized petitions to express their requests and grievances."); Ruth Bogin, Petitioning
and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 391,
392 (1988) (discussing pre- and post-Revolutionary America); Higginson, supra note
3, at 153 ("Not only [colonial Connecticut's] enfranchised population, but also unrep-
resented groups . . . represented themselves and voiced grievances through
petitions.").
90. See Smith, The Right to Petition, supra note 24, at 46 ("A content analysis of
the colonial charters shows that petition appears, either specifically or as one of the
'ancient liberties' of Englishmen, in over fifty provisions.").
91. Smith's argument that New Jersey limited the scope of petition is incorrect.
Quoting the "Concession and Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of
New Jersey," which states, "It shall be lawful for the representatives of the Freehold-
ers, to make any address to the Lords touching the Governor and Council, or any of
them, concerning any grievances whatsoever, or any other thing they shall desire,
without the consent of the Governor and Council, or any of them," he argues that
"address for the redress of grievances is limited to representatives of free-holders."
Id. at 51. Smith's error is to read the Concession and Agreement as a limit on the
right of petition, rather than as a grant of power to the freeholders' representatives to
act on, that is, to address concerns to, the proprietary lords, regarding any grievance
without first obtaining the consent of the Governor and Council. It is, in that sense,
simply an emphatic statement of the petition of right.
92. See Letters Patent to Sir Humfrey Gylberte (June 11, 1578), reprinted in 1 The
Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the
States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of
America 49, 50-51 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. and compiler, Scholarly Press 1909)
[hereinafter 1 Federal and State Constitutions].
And wee doe graunt to the sayd sir Humfrey, his heires and assignes, and to
all and every of them, and to all and every other person and persons, being
of our allegiance, whose names shall be noted or entred in some of our
courts of Record, within this our Realme of England, and that with the as-
sent of the said sir Humfrey, his heires or assignes, shall nowe in this journey
for discoverie, or in the second journey for conquest hereafter, travel to such
lands, countries and territories as aforesaid, and to their and every of their
heires: that they and every or any of them being either borne within our
sayd Realmes of England or Ireland, or within any other place within our
allegiance, and which hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the lands,
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countreys and territories, with such license as aforesayd, shall and may have,
and enjoy all the priveleges of free denizens and persons native of England,
and within our allegiance: any law, custome, or usage to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.; Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh (March 25, 1584), reprinted in id. at 53, 55 (-all the
priuiledges of free Denizens, and persons natiue of England"); Third Charter of Vir-
ginia (March 12, 1611), reprinted in 7 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or
Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3802, 3806 (Francis Newton
Thorpe, ed. and compiler 1909) (Scholarly Press, 1909) (similar) [hereinafter 7 Fed-
eral and State Constitutions]; Ordinances for Virginia-July 24-Aug. 3, 1621), re-
printed in id. at 3810, 3812 (binding General Assembly to English "Form of
Government, Laws, Customs... and other Administration of Justice .... ); A Grant
of the Province of Maine to Sir Ferdinando Gorges and John Mason, Esq.. (August
10, 1622), reprinted in 3 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Charters, and
Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Form-
ing the United States of America 1621, 1624 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed. and com-
piler 1909) (Scholarly Press, 1909) [hereinafter 3 Federal and State Constitutions]
(Gorges and Mason "covenant ... [to] establish such government ... as neere as may
be to the laws and customs of the realme of England .... "); Charter of the Colony of
New Plymouth Granted to William Bradford and His Associates (1629), reprinted in
id. at 1841, 1844 ("[T]he said lawes and orders [of the colony shall not be] repugnante
to the lawes of Englande . . . ."); Charter of Massachusetts Bay (March 4, 1629),
reprinted in id. at 1846, 1853, 1857 (similar); Sir Robert Health's Patent 5 Charles 1st
(October 30, 1629), reprinted hi 1 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 69, 71-72
(similar); Grant of New Hampshire to Capt. John Mason (November 7, 1629), re-
printed in 4 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Charters, and Other Or-
ganic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the
United States of America 2433, 2436 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed. and compiler 1909)
(Scholarly Press, 1909) (similar) [hereinafter 4 Federal and State Constitutions]; Char-
ter of Maryland (June 20, 1632), translation reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitu-
tions, supra, at 1677, 1680-81 (similar); Grant of the Province of Maine (April 15,
1639), reprinted in id. at 1625, 1628, 1630 (similar); Patent for Providence Plantations
(March 14, 1643), reprinted in 6 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Char-
ters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Hereto-
fore Forming the United States of America 3209, 3210-11 (Francis Newton Thorpe,
ed. and compiler 1909) (Scholarly Press, 1909) (similar) [hereinafter 6 Federal and
State Constitutions]; Charter of Connecticut (April 20, 1662), reprinted in 1 Federal
and State Constitutions, supra, at 529, 533 ("[Tjhe Subjects ... and every of their
Children ... shall have and enjoy all Liberties and Immunities of free and natural
Subjects... as if they and every of them were born within the realm of England.... "
(emphasis in original)); id. at 533-34 (non-repugnancy clause); Charter of Carolina
(March 24, 1663), reprinted in 5 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Char-
ters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Hereto-
fore Forming the United States of America 2743, 2746 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.
and compiler, Scholarly Press, 1909) [hereinafter 5 Federal and State Constitutions]
(non-repugnancy clause); Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July
8, 1663), reprinted in 6 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3211, 3215 (similar);
Grant of the Province of Maine (March 12, 1664), reprinted in 3 Federal and State
Constitutions, supra, at 1637, 1639 (similar); The Concession and Agreement of the
Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea, or New Jersey, to and with All
and Every the Adventurers and All Such as Shall Settle or Plant There (February 10,
1664), reprinted in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2535, 2537-38 (similar);
Concessions and Agreements of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of Carolina
(1665), reprinted in id. at 2756, 2758 (similar); Charter of Carolina (June 30, 1665),
reprinted in id. at 2761, 2764-65 (similar), Grant of the Province of Maine (June 26,
1674), reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 1641, 1642 (similar);
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The colonists, however, did not rely solely on charters to guarantee
their right to petition. To the contrary, many of the colonial assem-
blies explicitly affirmed the colonists' right to petition for redress. The
colonial affirmations of their chartered rights took various forms.
Read literally, these affirmations were neither consistent in their lan-
guage nor in the persons to whom the right apparently adhered. In
every case, however, they presented some statement of the right.
When it adopted the Body of Liberties in 1641, Massachusetts was
among the first colonies explicitly to affirm the right. The stated
breadth of the right is, moreover, indicative of the extent to which
petition was regarded as a key political right.
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall
have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councell, or Towne
meeting, and either by speech or writing to move any lawfull, sea-
sonable, and materiall question, or to present any necessary motion,
complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting hath
proper cognizance, so it [can] be done in convenient time, due or-
der, and respective manner.
By its terms, the Body of Liberties opened the governing bodies not
just to residents, but to anyone who had reason to communicate with
the colonial authorities, even those who were not free. The rigid di-
chotomy of slave and free that would come to characterize America
was still on the horizon at this early point in colonial history. Because
slavery was not a condition embodied in contemporary English do-
mestic practice, not excluding slaves implicitly included them in the
right to petition-at least in theory. As Winthrop Jordan has noted,
however, not only was chattel slavery known to inhabitants of the Bay
Colony, they "codified their ambivalence" about it in that same Body
of Liberties, on the one hand prohibiting slavery in the colony and on
the other allowing it.94 The authors of the Body of Liberties therefore
Charter or Fundamental Laws, of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon (1676), reprinted in
5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2548, 2548 (similar); Commission of John
Cutt (September 18, 1680), reprinted in 4 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at
2446, 2446 ("Our loving Subjects ... may be protected and Defended in their respec-
tive rights, liberties & properties . . . ."); Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania
(1681), reprinted in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3035, 3038 (non-re-
pugnancy clause); Commission of Sir Edmund Andros for the Dominion of New Eng-
land (April 7, 1688), reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 1863,
1864 (same); Charter of Massachusetts Bay (October 7, 1691), reprinted in id. at 1870,
1882 (same); Charter of Georgia (June 9, 1732), reprinted in 2 Federal and State Con-
stitutions, supra, at 765, 770 (same); see also Smith, Shall Make No Law, supra note 3,
at 305-07 (listing in two appendices colonial charter protections for "ancient liberties"
and enjoyment of "All Rights and Liberties of Englishmen").
93. A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New England (De-
cember 1641), reprinted in 1 Documents on Fundamental Human Rights: The Anglo-
American Tradition 122, 124 (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., ed. & compiler, 1963) (1951)
[hereinafter 1 Documents on Fundamental Rights].
94. Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Ne-
gro, 1550-1812, at 67 (1968).
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knew of slavery among other forms of servitude, but did not explicitly
exclude slaves from the right. And, as Oscar and Mary Handlin have
noted, slavery was a condition, albeit an extreme one, on a continuum
describing forms of labor in America: "[T]he antithesis of 'free' was
not 'slave' but unfree; and, within the condition of unfreedom, law
and practice recognized several gradations."95 Thus, in Massachusetts
at least, slaves, as well as, for example, indentured servants, had the
right to petition-again, at least in theory.
Not all colonies were so explicit or so liberal with political rights. In
1639, for example, when the Maryland General Assembly passed an
"Act for the Liberties of the People," it did so in terms both more
general and less generous: "[A]l Christian inhabitants of the colony,
slaves excepted, shall have and enjoy all such rights and privileges and
free customs... as any natural born subject of England hath or ought
to have and enjoy."9 6 In some places and at some times, therefore,
the universality of the right was sometimes compromised, although,
yet again, that compromise may also have been only theoretical.
Nonetheless, many years later, Maryland's neighbor, Virginia, in a
confrontation with British authorities over Virginia's support of Mas-
sachusetts in its opposition to the Townshend Acts, affirmed what had,
in practice, been the right widely exercised virtually everywhere in the
colonies. "[I]t is the undoubted privilege of the inhabitants of this
colony, to petition their sovereign for redress of grievances ...."I
The term "inhabitants" accurately reflected the breadth of participa-
tion by that point.98
2. Participation-The Practice
The enfranchised-property-owning adult white males-made the
most vigorous use of petitions.99 Even the better off, who had both
95. Oscar & Mary F. Handlin, Origirs of the Southern Labor System, in Colonial
America: Essays in Politics and Social Development 341, 343 (Stanley N. Katz ed.,
1971).
96. An Act for the Liberties of the People, collected in 1 Archives of Maryland:
Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembley of Maryland, January 1637/8 - Sep-
tember 1664, at 41 (William Hand Browne ed., 1883). Because slavery as a legal con-
dition was an American, not an English, domestic institution, the exclusion of slaves
did not mean that the right was theoretically narrower in Maryland than England-
the class of individuals excluded did not exist, as such, in England. Of course, to the
extent Maryland's implicit prohibition was enforced, a portion of the population
would not enjoy the right.
97. Virginia Resolutions (May 16, 1769), reprinted in 1 Documents on Fundamen-
tal Rights, supra note 93, at 176, 176.
98. See Bogin, supra note 89, at 395 (describing her examination of petitions
presented from 1762 until 1794 in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina).
99. In discussing the use of petitions in the colonies, I have relied on Bailey's mon-
ograph on Virginia, which is based on a thorough study of unpublished primary
sources (manuscript petitions), Higginson's note on Connecticut, which surveys pub-
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formal and informal measures of political suasion available to them to
a greater degree than others, used petitions. In Virginia, for example,
"[p]rominent political figures, wealthy planters and merchants, local
officials, and other members of the upper class petitioned the assem-
bly on numerous occasions."'100 Their concerns usually reflected their
status. Landowners sought legislative termination of entail; men of
property sought the assistance of one colonial legislature in disputes
over land claims contested by other colonies; men of money and ambi-
tion sought the establishment of governmental offices in their locali-
ties. 1  In short, the well-born and well-off sought governmental
assistance to maintain and enhance their social position.)°
Nonetheless, not all white male propertied inhabitants of the colo-
nies could necessarily be counted among the powerful, well-born, or
well-off. Indeed, scholarly examination of some of the available evi-
dence has made clear that the white, male, and propertied, except in
the most general manner, cannot be regarded as homogenous, in class,
occupation, or ideology, among other interests. Within the large class
identifiable as white, male, and propertied, discernable, though chang-
ing, ideological and occupational groups have been identified.10 3
lished primary sources (petitions printed or mentioned in official records), and other
secondary literature which examines similar published and unpublished sources in
several colonies, though for purposes other than surveying the use of petitions. I have
supplemented these materials by examining all references to petitions, including cop-
ies of and excerpts from petitions in the published records of Pennsylvania, Georgia,
and New Jersey. The quality of published colonial records varies widely, though they
have been collected and microfilmed as "Published Colonial Records of the American
Colonies," available from Research Publications. (Title Listing on file with author.)
Philip Hamburger generously shared his microfilm of religious petitions in Virginia
with me. Although manuscript petitions are available, the quality of the collections in
official state files, state libraries, historical societies, and elsewhere varies enormously
from state to state. Record-keeping policies, both formal and informal, as well as the
ravages of time-including fire, floods, insects, vermin, and the Revolutionary and
Civil Wars-have made the collections spotty. Moreover, modern libraries are just
that, modem, designed for modem concerns. The decline of petitioning means,
among other things, that petitions have not been collected, saved, and categorized as
have statutes, appellate cases, and the like. For these reasons, as well as reasons of
the economy of time and the difficulties in verifying source materials, I do not cite to
unpublished petitions. I urge others to make more detailed inquiries than I have been
able to make.
100. Bailey, supra note 35, at 41-42.
101. Id. at 42.
102. See id. (noting a petition calling for economic privileges in colonial Virginia);
Tully, supra note 19, at 144 (discussing Pennsylvania); Higginson, supra note 3, at 151
(noting the same in colonial Connecticut).
103. Ruth Bogin set out to find such groups in her examination:
The vast scope of petitioning far exceeded my expectations and precluded
full analysis. For close reading I made a selection of fifty-eight petitions to
state or colonial legislatures (in addition to eight others reprinted or ana-
lyzed in secondary sources) in order to study the tone and language that
poor and middle-class Americans were using in the late eighteenth century
to press for redress of economic grievances, and to ferret out the ideological
arguments they made or implied in support of their claims. One or more of
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Eighteenth century Virginia, for example, witnessed passage of leg-
islation suggested by petition that served perceived economic needs of
different groupings within the political economy. Not all such peti-
tion-based legislation was mere interest group politics of the dominant
group, however. At times, the Virginia government acted to control
one economic group for the benefit of another. Nonetheless, as when
it "forb[ade] the exportation or engrossing of staple foodstuffs during
periods of domestic shortage,"" the resulting legislation had a genu-
ine public character. Such regulation tempered the profits, if not the
avarice, of the planting and commercial classes, while at the same time
reinforcing the state's role as the enforcer of reciprocal obligation
among society's constituent elements.10 5
Eighteenth century Pennsylvania saw similar petition-prompted
regulation, which tempered the gain of one occupational group to pre-
serve spheres of operation for others. In Pennsylvania, for example,
petitions regularly called for regulation of tanners to limit exportation
and thus preserve the work of cordivariners and sadlers. The tanners,
not surprisingly, counterpetitioned-apparently unsuccessfully-in
their own defense. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania example is an ex-
cellent cautionary tale concerning overreading the ideological compo-
nent of petitions, for the tanners were, simultaneously, the topic of
petitions complaining of the quality of their product. 6 In the quality
complaint it is difficult to discern the same radical ideological compo-
nent as one might tease out of the exportation complaint. The com-
plaints do, however, identify a clear occupational basis for the
petitions.
As the Pennsylvania example suggests, while the petitions of groups
and strata could carry ideologically charged messages, most of the
the following criteria guided my choice of documents: legibility, inclusion of
a date or indication of probable timing, numerous signers, lower-class occu-
pations, references to ideology, and the substance of the petitions. I concen-
trated on petitions endorsing price control and related measures for equal
access to scarce necessities, advocating paper money and other forms of
debtor relief, protesting regressive tax policies, and demanding widened access
to landownership.
Bogin, supra note 89, at 395-96 (emphasis added). Her source selection led her to
overstate the ideologically radical element of the components of society she identifies.
Other studies, such as Bailey's, suggest that, while radical ideology did on occasion
characterize the demands of certain groups, radicalism was rarely dominant. See Bai-
ley, supra note 35, at 43-45. Indeed, as the unstudied petitions left out of Bogin's own
survey appear to suggest, even in the Revolutionary era, an important period of radi-
calism in America, petition-based radical expression was sporadic. Nonetheless,
Bogin's work makes quite clear that petition did serve overtly political ends of certain
societal components. See Bogin, supra note 89, at 395-97.
104. Bailey, supra note 35, at 90.
105. See id
106. Joan de Lourdes Leonard, The Organization and Procedure of the Penn-
sylvania Assembly 1682-1776, 62 Pa. Mag. of Hist. & Biography 376, 377 n.3 (1948)
(discussing the role of petitions in compelling change in the tanning industry).
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time they simply reflected the background ideological assumptions of
a society that recognized as legitimate both individual and collective
grievances. Components of society had the right to call on society at
large for assistance because colonists "conceived of a properly or-
dered society as an organic whole, a conception which implied the
existence of interests common to both rulers and ruled."'0 7 The recip-
rocal component of such assistance was not necessarily overtly redis-
tributional, but could also be developmental; that is, the requested aid
could be seen simply as a subsidy. Just as uncompensated takings re-
flected colonial desire for general prosperity, 08 even as they were re-
distributing wealth, most petitions, even those clearly identifiable by
class or occupational group, usually sought uncontroversial regulation
that might benefit the economy or polity generally. 10 9
Although they are more difficult to identify than the enfranchised,
disenfranchised white males also exercised the right to petition." 0 In
one group, however, the disenfranchised can be easily discerned. No-
where is the evidence for the existence of the formal political partici-
pation of the disenfranchised clearer than in the flow of petitions from
prisoners to colonial authorities."' In keeping with the quasi-judicial
nature of petitions, most of these petitions have a habeas-like quality
to them. 1 2 Inherent in the broader capacity to alter court judgments
via legislative act," 3 of course, was a legislative power to alter not just
the judgment itself, but also sentences. Debt prisoners, for exam-
ple, filed many such petitions, 15 a phenomenon that, not surprisingly,
107- Tully, supra note 19, at 140.
108. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 695-96 (1985).
109. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 35, at 90-108 (discussing subjects of petitions and
economic legislation in eighteenth century Virginia); Leonard, supra note 106, at 370-
78 (discussing economic subjects of "universal concern" in colonial Pennsylvania);
Higginson, supra note 3, at 150-52 (discussing developmental and economic concerns,
among others, in colonial Connecticut).
110. Professor Tully links petitioning to "long-term electoral confidence," Tully,
supra note 19, at 142, thus allowing the inference that petitioning's power was linked
to the exercise of the franchise. Elsewhere in his excellent article, however, he notes
that women, clearly non-voters, id. at 143, and "lower levels of society," likely non-
voters, id. at 144, also petitioned. He does not, therefore, attribute independent polit-
ical and constitutional significance to petitioning, despite an understanding of colonial
society and petitioning that parallels mine. Id. at 154. His view is thus closer to one
which identifies petitioning as significant only insofar as it relates, even indirectly, to
electoral politics.
111. See Higginson, supra note 3, at 146.
112. Cf. Olson, supra note 19, at 546 ("In their response to constituents' appeals,
the assemblies intermixed legislative and judicial functions.").
113. See Higginson, supra note 3, at 146 ("Regularly, the reply to a petitioner was
legislation reversing a lower court's judgment.").
114. See id. at 146 nn.20-21.
115. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 106, at 380 n.16 (discussing the example of the
petition of John Ryan, a debt prisoner).
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accelerated during times of economic hardship.1 6 Whether impris-
oned for crimes with modem counterparts or for reasons unrelated to
criminal activity, such as debt, prisoners' highly individualized griev-
ances carried with them seeds of legislation-legislation that would
extend beyond immediate relief for the petitioner. Not only did such
petitions create a movement for forms of debt relief," 7 they also led
to such legislative actions as the investigation of the treatment of
prisoners.1
8
Given that the colonial charters and subsequent affirmations by co-
lonial legislatures quite often contained language that formally pro-
vided for widespread use of the right, the use of petitions by white
males, propertied or not, enfranchised or not, may not be particularly
surprising. What is far more demonstrative of the significance of peti-
tioning in American political culture was its use by those usually con-
ceived of today as having been completely outside of direct
participation in the formal political culture," 9 namely, women, blacks
(whether free or slave), Native Americans, and, perhaps, even
children. 120
Petitioning provided not just a method whereby individuals within
those groups might seek reversal of harsh treatments by public au-
thority, judicial or otherwise, but also a method whereby such individ-
uals could seek the employment of public power to redress private
wrongs that did not fit neatly into categories of action giving rise to a
lawsuit.12 1 In that sense, even individual grievances embodied in peti-
tions carried powerful political weight simply because of the individ-
ual's capacity to invoke public power. That such power might reside
in the hands of those with little, or no, other formal political power'22
greatly heightens the constitutional significance of the right."z
116. See Bogin, supra note 89, at 407-12 (discussing debtors' efforts during the post-
Revolutionary War period).
117. See id. at 410-11.
118. See Higginson, supra note 3, at 147 n.27.
119. See Gregory A. Mark & Christopher L. Eisgruber, Introduction: Law and
Political Culture, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 425 & n.37 (1988) (discussing the status of
blacks, women, and children as embodied in the Constitution).
120. While I have no evidence of children signing petitions, many petitions were
filed to obtain something for a child or children.
121. We have only recently had our attention drawn to the political significance of
the individual's capacity to seek the employment of public power. See, e.g., Allen
Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (1989)
(discussing, among other things, the significance of the demise of private prosecution
of criminal offenses).
122. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 6; Bogin, supra note 89, at 392 ("Petitions,
although used by all levels of American society, give us the voice of people who sel-
dom if ever proclaimed their social goals and political opinions in other written
forms."); Higginson, supra note 3, at 153.
123. See Bogin, supra note 89, at 421 n.124 ("The 'many' needed the instrument of
the petition especially because they had few other opportunities to reach government
officials."); Higginson, supra note 3, at 145 ("The dialogue of petition and response
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Despite its availability, petition was, unsurprisingly, something of an
extraordinary remedy for members of these groups. Insofar as wo-
men, slaves, free blacks, Native Americans, and children constituted
identifiable groups with coherent political, social, and economic
needs, however, those groups had clear places in society. Because
they were, in the organic metaphor, not at the apex of the hierarchy,
however, their relatively lesser use of petitions is not surprising. In-
deed, it is to be expected. It is all the more important, then, to note
what their grievances were, how they were expressed, and the ways in
which their grievances reflected matters of political significance. 124
Unfortunately, we know too little of their grievances.
In the records of colonial Georgia, for example, there are instances
of petitions from women as a matter of course, though the records
give only hints at what those petitioners actually wrote. 125 "The Min-
utes of the Common Council of the Trustees for Establishing the Col-
ony of Georgia in America" contain several such examples, some
quite mundane-sounding, others sounding quite odd to the modern
ear. On May 5, 1735, for example, Mary Bateman petitioned on be-
half of her married son, who "had great illness" and whose "Servant
left him." She sought "Credit for a Year's Maintenance" and a new
servant. She got both.126 The following January 16, the Council enter-
tained Susannah Haselfoot's petition "on behalf of her Husband,"'27
asking to swap a lot in Savannah for a one hundred fifty acre plot "as
near as may be to some River or Island."' 28 As with Mary Bateman,
between inhabitants and colonial assemblies was intimately related to the structure of
colonial politics.").
124. Historians have made this claim for other eras in American history as well.
See, e.g., "Placed in the Power of Violence" The Divorce Petition of Evelina Gregory
Roane, 1824, 100 Va. Mag. Hist. & Biography 29, 29-30 (Thomas E. Buckley, ed.,
1992) (discussing the importance of petitions in "explain[ing] a multitude of social,
political, and economic developments"); Betty Wood, White Women, Black Slaves and
the Law in Early National Georgia: The Sunbury Petition of 1791, 35 Hist. J. 611, 613
(1992) [hereinafter Wood, Sunbury Petition].
125. Hendrik Hartog has suggested to me that a woman's status as feme covert
might have affected her legal capacity to petition. I have found no explicit law to that
effect, nor have I found any instance of a petition from a woman being rejected on
such grounds. The records, insofar as I have examined them, make no distinction
between petitions from married and unmarried women. Nonetheless, Professor
Hartog raises a critical and interesting question about women's rights and the right to
petition. It is certainly possible, and at first glance seems likely, that marriage might
have disabled women from petitioning in the same manner as other rights were sub-
sumed within marriage. Nonetheless, that does not seem to have been the case,
though no evidence exists, so far as I am aware, that anyone claimed prior to the
nineteenth century that the petition right transcended marriage.
126. 2 The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 99 (Allen D. Candler com-
piler, 1904).
127. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 141.
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Susannah Haselfoot got what she prayed for.129 June 27, 1739, wit-
nessed petitions from Ann Emery and Mary Crowder. Each dealt
with property in Georgia and Emery's petition prayed for "a License
to sell beer.' 130 The Council dealt with other petitions for assistance
or recompense for losses over the years. 31
Local authorities received similar prayers. For example, on Octo-
ber 16, 1741, the President and Assistants for the County of Savannah
had to deal with several matters, including two petitions from women.
The first petition, from two couples, "Samuel Lyon and his Wife, and
John Erinxman and his Wife," is all the more interesting in that the
Erinxmans and Mrs. Lyon (though not apparently her husband) "had
been indentured Servants." The President and Assistants granted the
request for "a certain Donation" owed them.'3 2 The second petition,
from the widow Elizabeth Bowling, recited "her bad State of Health"
and prayed for financial assistance, which was granted. 133 That the
authorities would entertain petitions of female indentured servants
and destitute women suggests something of the legitimate breadth of
the right as it was understood by the colonists, even if the claims seem
narrow in scope and private in nature.
By the Revolutionary period in Virginia, however, women joined
with men in some petitions of clearly public character, especially those
involving issues of religion.'34 Those obviously public petitions should
not be too neatly distinguished from more classically private matters.
Virginia women's petitions concerning their widow's pensions for
their husband's military service, 135 a seventeenth-century Connecticut
women's grievance concerning a minister's inappropriate behavior, t36
or other individual grievances, however private they may seem at first
glance, were also of public significance. At a minimum, they suggest
failures within the larger political realm to provide for the deserving
or to police the powerful.
The most important insight we may glean from considering in-
stances of women petitioning, however, is one that is easily over-
looked because it is a background assumption to a twentieth century
observer: The fact that the women petitioned at all meant that they
129. Id. (conditioning the swap on James (the husband) having made improvements
to the town lot if that had been a condition of the original grant and requiring James
otherwise to forfeit the lot).
130. Id. at 287-88 (quotation at 288).
131. See, e.g., id. at 346-423 (November 19, 1740); 449-67 (May 23, 1745).
132. 6 The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 13 (Allen D. Candler com-
piler, 1906).
133. Id; see also id at 28 (petition of the "Widow Keeler" for relief, meeting of
April 3, 1742); id. at 176 (petition of the "Widow Nongazer" for relief to the President
and Assistants for the Colony of Georgia, meeting of March 26, 1747).
134. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 44.
135. See id.
136. See Higginson, supra note 3, at 153 n.74.
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felt they had a right to appeal to public authority for help. 37 Likely
not all women shared that feeling, but at least these women felt that
they were sufficiently within the polity to be heard and helped. On
their own, women may well have voiced not just individuated, but also
collective, economic grievances concerning governmental policy in co-
lonial society. In the early national period, as historian Linda Kerber
has discovered, records exist concerning at least one petition seeking a
political remedy for an economic grievance. 138
Identifying and analyzing petitions of slaves and free blacks is at
least, if not more, problematic than identifying and analyzing those of
women, for several reasons. Unless the signatories identified them-
selves by race or status, discerning their racial identity can be very
difficult. Also, petitions by slaves and free blacks, like those of wo-
men, are comparatively rare. Nonetheless, clear examples of their ef-
fective political participation via petition exist. Raymond Bailey has
described one of the most prominent of them in Virginia:
A group of mulattoes and free blacks petitioned the house in 1769
to ask that their wives and daughters be exempted from paying poll
taxes, a tax assessed on adult males of both races but on black fe-
males only. Both houses of the assembly and the governor agreed
that the request was reasonable, and a bill ending the poll tax on
black women was passed into law.139
This pre-Revolutionary petition is remarkable for a number of rea-
sons. Not only does it antedate the Revolution and whatever addi-
tional egalitarian sentiments attended independence, it was also a
petition from a "group" of African-Americans. A group of African-
Americans, even free, acting in concert on a political matter was as
incendiary an action as could be conceived in the slave South. All the
more stunning, then, that the petition was not simply heard, but
granted.
Revolutionary America saw an upsurge of petitioning by African-
Americans. These petitions, while nominally personal-they dealt
with status, both in economic terms (property seeking emancipa-
tion) 4 ' or in legal and political terms141-obviously raised issues con-
cerning the most profound of public matters. In the Revolutionary
137. Others have also made this point. See Wood, Sunbury Petition, supra note 124,
at 615 & n.16.
138. See Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revo-
lutionary America 98-99 (1980) (discussing the petition of Charleston seamstresses
seeking increased duties for imported clothing).
139. Bailey, supra note 35, at 44 (citation omitted).
140. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 35, at 44 (noting "dozens" of such petitions);
George Fishman, Taking a Stand for Freedom in Revolutionary New Jersey: Prime's
Petition of 1786, 56 Sci. & Soc'y 353, 353-56 (1992) (including "Text of Prime's Peti-
tion to the State Legislature, November 6, 1786"); Higginson, supra note 3, at 153 n.77
(approving the emancipation petition of a male slave of a Tory slaveowner).
141. See Sidney Kaplan, The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolu-
tion 1770-1800, at 11-14, 22-29, 184, 186-90 (1973).
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era, some of the petitioners were bold enough to claim "a naturel right
to our freedoms without Being depriv'd of them by our fellow men as
we are a freeborn Pepel and have never forfeited this Blessing by aney
compact or agreement whatever.' 42 Thus, not only did petitions
serve to raise the topic of slavery, but also, by the very act of petition-
ing, the slaves and free blacks by themselves put the issue of their hu-
manity143 and the very extent of their membership in the polity into
the political debate.
Petitions by Native Americans, while also rare, raised grievances of
public importance, for they usually involved questions concerning tri-
bal land.'" Significantly, the Native Americans who petitioned did so
with a clear tribal identification and their petitions concerned a matter
of clear and classic concern to an organic community, the land. What
is equally intriguing is that their tribal status, uniquely not a part of
the larger immigrant community, did not preclude consideration of
their petitions. 45
Making too much of the petitions of women, African-Americans,
and Native Americans is easy to do. By their rarity, such petitions
seem to stand out as examples of the potential for the accommodation
of all in the political process. One cannot know what might have hap-
pened, however, had members of such groups individually or collec-
tively sought regularly and often to press their access to the political
process via petition. They might well have precipitated their preclu-
sion altogether. That is, had large numbers of women, African-Amer-
icans, or Native Americans actually used the process, a political
reaction formally excluding them might have ensued. The structure of
a hierarchical and corporate community, however, imposes a powerful
form of self-control in deference, often extreme deference,' 46 while at
142. Petition to Governor Thomas Gage and the Massachusetts General Court,
May 25, 1774, quoted in Kaplan, supra note 141, at 13.
143. See, e.g., 14 Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, from
Its Organization to the Termination of the Revolution 637 (1853) (summarizing peti-
tioners' desire to set aside a portion of "the Negroes burial ground, for the purpose of
burying their dead exclusively," February 10, 1786).
144. See Higginson, supra note 3, at 153 n.76.
145. See, e.g., 16 Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania from
Its Organization to the Termination of the Revolution 853 (1853) (assigning a date
"for the consideration of the petition of the Cornplanter and others, Chiefs of Six
Nations of Indians," May 5, 1790).
146. Several historians have explored the political meaning of deference in colonial
society. See, e.g., James A. Henretta, The Evolution of American Society, 1700-1815,
at 92-95, 112-14, 169 (1973); Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783,
103-04 (1973) (describing the role deference played in the control of the legislatures
by the upper classes); Roy N. Lokken, The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Polit-
ical Thought; 16 Wm. & Mary Q. 568 (1959); J.R. Pole, Historians and the Problem of
Early American Democracy, 67 Am. Hist. Rev. 626 (1962) (discussing the role of def-
erence in the relationship between the different classes). They neither used petitions
as evidence, however, nor discussed petitions as examples of inherently deferential
political participation. Alan Tully sees petitions as embodying a functional role, as
"reliable communication lines" in a system characterized by deference. Tully, supra
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the same time mandating-because of that deference-the attention
of those to whom deference is paid. That form of deference was an
aspect of the "social contract" of the American colonies. It was that
facet of colonial America that helped legitimize and give force to
petitioning.
3. Pervasiveness
Among the most important distinctions between a modern, liberal
state and an older, more corporate and hierarchical society is the de-
gree to which state participation in the lives of component social
groups, as well as intervention into the lives of individuals, was both
more common and more legitimate. Unlike in a liberal society, in
which individual autonomy is paramount,' 47 identity in a more organic
society, group, or community is-or in colonial America was-of
greater importance. In such societies, like the colonies, membership
in a group came about both by choice and by default. Membership
carried with it, at least to some extent, the mores of that group. And,
in a hierarchical society, the state (or the church), as the ultimate en-
tity, had the capacity, indeed the right and the duty, to intervene in
matters concerning its component units, for the stability and good of
the whole.' 48 As Bernard Bailyn has noted,
All of the settlers in whatever colony presumed a fundamental rela-
tionship between social structure and political authority. Drawing
on a common medieval heritage, continuing to conceive of society
as a hierarchical unit, its parts justly and naturally separated into
inferior and superior levels, they assumed that superiority was indi-
visible; there was not one hierarchy for political matters, another for
social purposes.14 9
One can, of course, carry Bailyn's observation too far. Especially in
American history, excluding the individual as an independent agent,
whether moral, political, or economic, would be a profound mis-
take. 5 ' Nonetheless, elements of the corporate identity appeared
clearly in colonial America. Although erosion of corporate identity is
part of this country's history, echoes, at least, persisted in one form or
note 19, at 144. While they were that, they were also much more-they were the form
of political participation. As I suggest elsewhere, petitioning was important not just
for its communicative content-else why encrust it with formalistic requirements
when any speech or writing could keep lines of communication open-but also for the
character of the communication.
147. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 14, at 694 n.2 (contrasting a liberal society as
"atomistic" and a republican society as organic for the purpose of understanding the
historical constitutional significance of just compensation).
148. Bernard Bailyn, Politics and Social Structure in Virginia, in Colonial America:
Essays in Politics and Social Development 135, 136 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971).
149. Id.
150. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and
Culture, 1760-1800, at 9-11 (1990).
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another through the Revolution, if not later, most prominently in the
animating concept of the common good. 151
Petitions were key vehicles for maintaining the balance in colonial
society, for they enabled one individual or group to appeal to the state
formally to maintain not just the political, but the social balance, as
well.'52 Corporate identity, of course, existed not just in formal polit-
ical communities and economic entities, 153 but also where religious,
moral, and other matters were concerned. 54 Petitions were a power-
ful and effective means for expressing those concerns to the organs of
the community-the governing bodies-that could do something
about them. Petitions were, as we have seen, the formal method for
expressing grievances and obtaining relief when avenues such as law-
suits were unavailable. 155
Petitioners in colonial America constantly made evident their con-
cerns about the structure and acts of local government. Creation of
new local and county governments was an object for which settlers
regularly petitioned as they moved into unsettled regions. When set-
tlement patterns altered the makeup of existing counties, residents
demonstrated no hesitancy in petitioning to alter boundary lines. Set-
tlers petitioned to move the location of county courthouses to facili-
tate community endeavors. The colonial authorities received, and
acted upon, petitions to strengthen the authority of the newly formed
communities. In all these matters, the colonial authorities often re-
ceived counterpetitions, requiring them to investigate and consider
their options. Petitions were the key vehicle for creating and regulat-
ing local communities. 56 The importance of the division and forma-
tion of these communities should not be underestimated, for even the
151. See, e.g., Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 53-65 (discussing the sacrifice of
individual interest for the common good).
152. Part of the balance was between the state and members of society, not just in
petitions for assistance, see supra notes 126, 133 and accompanying text, but also in
pressing both acknowledged and unacknowledged debts that the state owed its mem-
bers. See Desan, supra note 19, at 1463-75.
153. See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corpora-
tion in American Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441, 1443-55 (1987) (summarizing the or-
ganic view of municipal and business corporations in the early republic).
154. See, eg., Olson, supra note 19, at 553, 558.
155. In both English and American history another vehicle existed for identifiable
groups to seek redress, namely litigation. Group litigation, however, was an activity
that was severely limited in its scope, both in defining what constituted a "group" and
in defining the legitimate subject matters of litigation. Group litigation also fell in and
out of favor-sometimes for hundreds of years at a time. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class Action (1987).
156. See, eg., Bailey, supra note 35, at 68-69 (describing the indispensible role of
petitions in establishing and regulating local communities in Virginia); Tully, supra




suggestion that new communities be recognized or created could lead
to violence. 157
In other matters, where subsidiary groups were not formally consti-
tuted, petitions still played an instrumental role in determining the
direction of law. For example, the enslaved were never formally con-
stituted as a unit. The enslaved's coherence as a component of the
larger community is, however, beyond question. 158 Certainly the law
regulating them came to treat them as having commonalities sufficient
to create a group identity.15 9 Indeed, "[a]s slavery became an increas-
ingly significant institution in eighteenth-century Virginia, citizens
sent a number of petitions to the house concerning the slave codes
and the position of blacks in society."'6 ° Not only did slaves and free
blacks excite the deepest fears of criminal disruption, their increased
presence was seen literally to threaten the organic unity of the domi-
nant racial community, hence such petitions as those for ever greater
vigilance against miscegenation.161
Finally, nowhere is the organic aspect of society reflected in peti-
tioners' demands more prominently than in the interpenetration of
the political and religious realms. While religious doctrine itself ap-
pears not to have been directly the subject of petitions, 62 virtually
every other facet of the organization of religious affairs was. 163 In Vir-
ginia, for example, the history of the established church, itself not an
insignificant indicator of an organic aspect of society, is replete with
the constituting, reconstituting, and regulating of religious communi-
ties via petitions. 64 Parish boundaries, as with those of political com-
munities, were the subject of petitions. Resolution of contested vestry
elections, reversal of unpopular vestry actions, and even disestablish-
ment itself-reaching its peak with the famous "Ten-thousand Name"
petition of 1776-were objects of petitioners. 65 More telling, dissent-
157. See, e.g., Henretta, supra note 146, at 37 (noting the 1724 disruption of a town
meeting in Dedham, Massachusetts occasioned by a petition to divide the town);
Shalhope, supra note 150, at 13 (discussing cultural tension and petitioning in New
England in the 1760s).
158. See Gerald W. Mullin, Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-
Century Virginia x-xi (1972) (discussing the role of slaves in a "slave society").
159. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 95, at 341.
160. Bailey, supra note 35, at 121 (emphasis added). Slaves and free blacks acted
and reacted conscious that their racial identity served to constitute them separately
within society. Signatories signed not just for themselves, but "in behalf all thous who
by divine Permission are held in a state of slavery, within the bowels of a free Coun-
try." Kaplan, supra note 141, at 13 (quoting a June, 1773 petition to Governor Thomas
Hutchinson and the Massachusetts general court).
161. Bailey, supra note 35, at 121-22.
162. I, at least, have seen no such petitions.
163. Doctrinal schisms, of course, could well have been the unspoken bases on
which arose other conflicts that split parishes.





ers used their right to petition to require that central authority attend
to their demands to create their own communities within the larger
body of Christ.1 6
6
The list of topics that were the subjects of petitions could be elon-
gated. The point, however, is that few topics were considered out of
bounds by petitioners; that petition could be and was an effective in-
strument for participating in public affairs of all types; and that peti-
tions themselves quite often by way of the group represented by the
signatories, by the objects sought, or both, demonstrated the impor-
tance of group identity in colonial society. One should not, however,
overread the petitions. In some ways the groups represented by signa-
tories can be seen simply as interest groups pressing for selfish ends,
the individuals who petitioned no less so. Moreover, for a historical
claim to be worth making, the evidence ought to admit of at least a
hypothetical alternative that might falsify the claim that group identity
and petition are connected. Evidence for such an alternative explana-
tory claim exists. Colonial society had organic components, but the
individual mattered. Any thesis about the nature of colonial society
must therefore take both group identity and individual wants into ac-
count. Petitions served to facilitate individual and group participation
in public affairs. Petitions did so within the structures of a pre-liberal
polity. The organic aspects of the polity-deference based on status
within an organic hierarchy-resulted in the reciprocal obligation of
attention and consideration.
4. Power
The most important indicator of the existence of a political culture
of reciprocal obligation is not the success petitioners had in achieving
legislative embodiment of their objects, though that is not an inconse-
quential indicator. What is more striking is the absence of a particular
type of reaction, a reaction that one would expect today in other con-
texts; that is, the historical record appears to be devoid of colonial
authority denying that a person had the right to petition based on any
of the factors associated with disenfranchisement. Put another way,
petitions might have been rejected on the merits; they might have
been ignored for failure of sufficient supplication; they might have
been dismissed as absurd; but, they were not rejected on any ground
akin to standing. Indeed, their reception and reading was largely
automatic.167
The process of reception, reading, and consideration has been well-
described elsewhere.' 68 Higginson has contributed an important in-
166. Id.
167. See id. at 29; Higginson, supra note 3, at 143.
168. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 106, at 376-90 (describing the process in colonial




sight, however, about that process. He suggests that colonial legisla-
tors may well have accepted petitions on a wide variety of topics to
expand their own jurisdiction,169 just as Parliament had used petitions
to increase its power. That extremely valuable insight, and the long-
standing observation that petitions provided useful information to leg-
islators,'170 especially on subjects where petitions were followed by
counterpetitions,'171 have served to explain why colonial authority tol-
erated the breadth of topics mentioned by petitioners. While plausi-
ble, and perhaps even fully satisfactory, in explaining legislative
acceptance of the subjects raised, those explanations fail to account
for legislative tolerance of expressions by, much less legislative atten-
tion to, the grievances of the disenfranchised who were otherwise
powerless, the dispossessed who were otherwise politically penurious,
and the despised.
A conception of politics that takes group identity seriously can ex-
plain that reaction. A conception of politics that contains such an or-
ganic component also can explain the seriousness with which petitions
were treated. That is, any explanation that relies for its power on ex-
plication of the process of reception, reading, and consideration of pe-
titions presupposes a political culture in which all petitions are
considered constitutionally legitimate in the first instance.
5. The Declaration of Independence
Other than the near universal acceptance of petitioning in colonial
society, the breadth of participation by petitioners, and the almost un-
limited scope of the subject matter of petitions, the evidence for the
constitutional legitimacy of the right to petition is secondary-peti-
tioning was a constitutional right because people thought it was one
and defended it as one. 72 Indeed, unless we take the odd position
that the enumeration of complaints contained in the Declaration of
Independence is little but revolutionary rhetoric, 73 rather than a list
of actual complaints, even if overwrought, we must conclude that peti-
tioning was a, if not the, key vehicle providing protection for subjects
of the crown. The Declaration, after all, lists the King's "injuries and
169. Higginson, supra note 3, at 150-53.
170. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 31; Higginson, supra note 3, at 153-55; see also
Bogin, supra note 89, at 392 n.4 (describing petitions as the principal channel of com-
munication from inhabitants to government).
171. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 31.
172. See supra note 51 (discussing conventions of constitutional politics).
173. Pauline Maier has recently demonstrated that it is much more. See Pauline
Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence 105-23 (1997).
One reviewer, himself a prominent historian, declares that Maier's book "immedi-
ately takes its place as the definitive statement of the Declaration of Independence as
the embodiment of the American mind and historical experience." Richard Alan
Ryerson, An Expression of the American Mind: Pauline Maier Cautions Us Against
Misinterpreting the Significance of Our Most Treasured National Relic, N.Y. Times
Book Rev., July 6, 1997, at 9, 9.
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usurpations,"' 74 including among them his purported undermining of
the legitimate processes of colonial government, and only then notes:
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress
in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been an-
swered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus
marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people.' 75
These words bear close scrutiny.176
That petitions were a legitimate vehicle by which to complain of the
broadest spectrum of grievances is evident from the enumeration pre-
ceding the ultimate complaint, that the colonists' petitions fel on the
king's deaf ears. The Declaration's litany runs the gamut from polit-
ical usurpations to having "plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts,
burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people."'" The public
character of the grievances is immediately apparent, as is the colo-
nists' felt view that petition was an appropriate remedy, indeed a rem-
edy available, "[i]n every stage" of a grievance.1 78
The capstone of the list of grievances makes clear that the king's
ultimate violation, however, was his sundering of the bonds of polit-
ical society, especially the bonds of deference and obligation on which
hierarchial legitimacy rested. Having met the sole precondition for
reception by petitioning "in the most humble terms," the colonists felt
entitled to consideration.'79 Part of the Declaration's drama, not to
say its literary license, is in the answer sent by the king: "repeated
Injury," indeed "only by repeated Injury." 1s That more was ex-
pected, even required, in contemporary politics may be inferred even
from the sentence's structure. The clause in which the United States
complains that its citizens' petitions have been ignored ends not with a
period, but a colon.' 8 ' No form of punctuation available can more
closely cement clauses.
What, in the minds of the colonists, was the only real alternative?
They held that tyranny marked a society in which the rulers ignored
"a free People."'" What would they have expected? What in the
meaning of petitions and the process of reception made it the cap-
174. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
175. Id para. 30.
176. These words survived intact through each edit of the text, save for the addition
of "free" before "people." See Maier, supra note 173, app. C, at 240.
177. The Declaration of Independence para. 26 (U.S. 1776).
178. Id. para. 36.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. See generally Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (1967). Note also the conspicuous addition of "free" to the petition clause
of the Declaration. See supra note 176. Note also, however, the ambiguity-without
the addition of "free," the presumed scope of the right of petition can be read to
include even those people not free.
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stone grievance in the Declaration and ultimately underlay the inclu-
sion of the right to petition in the First Amendment?
Representative government, always an imperfect mechanism for re-
flecting the desires of the people, was the subject of great and public
reflection in the Revolutionary and early national periods. The Eng-
lish view was that "[m]en did not actually have to vote for members of
Parliament to be represented there."1 3 Against this view the colo-
nists ultimately, though not completely, rebelled.'84 Any system of
actual representation could not, after all, fully and completely repli-
cate the communities represented. Only society as a whole reflected
the whole society. That problem, however, was not the one that per-
meated the debates over representation.
For the colonists, a move toward greater actual representation, with
which they were relatively more familiar in their local assemblies than
were the English in Parliament, meant both an assurance that local
problems received consideration as well as the fear that the legislative
body would succumb to the forces of parochialism.8
Petitions remedied some of the imperfections of virtual representa-
tion, while embodying some of the principles of actual representa-
tion 86 A less mandatory form of address than an instruction, 87
183. Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 174.
184. See Shalhope, supra note 150, at 88; see also Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at
188 (describing acceptance of both actual and virtual representation by Americans in
the new republic).
185. See generally Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 184-85 (describing the colo-
nists' views on representation).
186. Petitioning embodied actual representation in the sense that the precise
desires of a clear portion of the population were laid before the representative, who in
turn took the prayer to the legislature and championed it as best he could. In that
sense, petitioning was as near an unmediated form of actual representation as
possible.
The imperfections of virtual representation are clear, even if one puts aside the
question of whether only a woman can represent the concerns of women, a poor per-
son the concerns of the impoverished, an African-American the concerns of free
blacks and slaves, and so on. What was really at stake was whether those voting,
rather than the representatives, really represented the population as a whole. Ameri-
cans simply wanted to ensure that those with the franchise be represented in the bod-
ies that made law. In that sense, voters collectively represented their communities,
including those who were unattached and could not vote, including not just disen-
franchised men, but also single women and free blacks. Voters individually repre-
sented smaller units of society-husbands and fathers exercised their vote on behalf
of the household, whose members held at least some interests in common as members
of the household. Even slaves maintained some interest in common with their mas-
ters, and post-Revolutionary petition gives us an example of even this perverse or-
ganic connection. Owners, for example, could and did petition for relief for slaves
convicted of crimes, even when slave codes provided for compensation when slaves
were executed. Thus, even when a master's property interest in a slave was protected
by compensation, some other nexus than ownership could connect master to slave.
See, e.g., Wood, Sunbury Petition, supra note 124, at 611-12 (discussing the clemency




petitions nonetheless, in colonial political custom, required a locality's
representative to present, if not champion, the document.s Petitions
thus ensured that topics of concern to the unrepresented were raised
in a body that purported to represent all the people, even a body lack-
ing representatives of all segments of the population. The procedure,
whereby a locality's representative ensured presentation and usually
more-such as support for the petition's claim-meant that even in a
system of virtual representation an element of actual representation
preserved the ideal of a body devoted to deliberation on, and resolu-
tion of, concerns to the populace.'8 9
In turn, by their very nature, petitions were a more active form of
participation than voting. Petitions signified both an unambiguous
statement that an issue was important to the signer and a clear point
of view on the issue. Often petitions included suggested legislative
language. In any case, because they were neither instructions-at one
extreme-nor merely a vote for a representative-at the other ex-
treme-they were also documents intended to persuade. They some-
times contained "learned and eloquent discourses, articulately
expressed wvith meticulous handwriting upon fine quality paper."' 90
Moreover, to convey the depth of sentiment within a community, peti-
tions were often posted in public places, advertised in newspapers,
and duplicated for simultaneous circulation. 19' The result of the com-
bination of publicity and argument, especially when combined with
their quasi-judicial status, was to ensure that a grievance was heard,
usually investigated, and often discussed and acted upon in the legisla-
tures. When controversial-especially when subject to counterpeti-
tion-petitions were regularly the object of lengthy discussion and
consideration in these bodies.'9 -
To the extent that petitioning gave a voice, however limited, to the unattached non-
voters and the attached but socially subordinate, it theoretically and potentially reme-
died the problem of misrepresentation in a system of virtual representation. Thus,
even a private grievance-such as a destitute widow praying for poor relief-gave
voice to concerns not otherwise represented. And, of course, the structure of the
culture ensured that the prayer would be heard. Of course, it goes without saying that
this vision of the right to petition left an enormous amount to be desired in practice,
but it fits well with a society that conceived of itself ideally, at least, more in organic
terms than we today conceive of our own society.
187. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 31-32; see also Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at
189-92 (discussing the use of instructions and the difficulties in their use in matters
beyond local concern).
188. See Bailey, supra note 35, at 29-31 (explaining that all petitions were
presented, but that most were "sponsored," i.e., explained and sheparded, by a local-
ity's representative to the House of Burgesses).
189. See id. at 27 (noting that "[d]uring the late seventeenth century the house de-
veloped a standard procedure for the transmitting of petitions, and in the eighteenth
century the procedure was amended slightly to insure that petitioners had ready ac-
cess to their elected representatives").
190. Id. at 26.
191. See id. at 26-27.
192. See id at 27-46 (describing eighteenth century petitioning procedure).
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II. THE CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION
If experience guided expectations, then the right to petition that
was embodied in the First Amendment was a particular tool in repub-
lican government. It gave the unrepresented a voice, one limited to
that of a supplicant to be sure, but a voice that nonetheless required a
hearing. The class of grievances that could be heard was wide, if not
unlimited. Moreover, as a political tool, the right to petition was both
emblematic and expressive of a society in which group identity was
significant. By their nature and in their language, petitions embodied
deference. In their content they conveyed community sentiment. In
their reception was embodied part of the colonial understanding of
representation: that a sufficiently serious grievance, however and
wherever generated, merited and would receive due consideration.
Given the English and colonial heritage, dramatized by Revolution-
ary claims culminating in the Declaration of Independence, it is unsur-
prising to find the right to petition unequivocally claimed by the
people in the earliest state constitutions. What is surprising, at least at
first glance, is that the claim was not universally made explicit in every
constitution, state or federal.
A. Confederation
1. Federal Authority
As the document embodying the confederal powers of the rebel-
lious colonies, the Articles of Confederation might have been ex-
pected to claim the right of petition in some fashion, even if limiting it
to the constituent states of the confederation. That expectation was
fulfilled, but in a very curious manner.
Read most generously, the Articles of Confederation deal with peti-
tioning in three articles, numbers II, IV, and IX. The first two can be
read to embody, in very general language, preservation of the right for
both individuals and groups. Article IX, by contrast, sets up petition-
ing as a method for resolving interstate conflict.
Article II, following an article the only function of which was to
name the confederation, was a reservation clause. It provided: "Each
State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation ex-
pressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled. 19 3
Because the Articles mentioned petitioning only in Article IX, ex-
pressly delegating certain tasks to the United States in Congress, 194
the general power to receive petitions, and to send them, was retained
by the states. Similarly, the jurisdictional reservation meant not only
that states could act on petitions insofar as their power allowed, but
193. Articles of Confederation art. II.
194. Id. art. IX.
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also that states had the authority to speak in the name of their entire
population to the states assembled in confederation. While, in this
context, the reservation of rights is more ambiguous, substantially
overlapping the reservations of power and jurisdiction, at a minimum
the reservation of rights would prohibit the United States in Congress
from penalizing a state or its delegates for petitionary activity.
Of greater importance than the place of petitioning for the states'
relation to the confederation-in the event a non-issue, as it turned
out-was Article IV's reservation of rights to individuals. By compar-
ison with the later statement of rights in the Constitution, or even in
comparison with the statements set out in contemporary state consti-
tutions, the clause was narrowly written:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different States in this Union, the
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several States ....
The first aspect of note is that this Article appears to check both state
and federal power, at least insofar as it applies to "free inhabitants" of
any state. That is, a "free inhabitant" of Delaware would be entitled
(at a minimum) to the rights of free citizens of Delaware, even if the
inhabitant were a free citizen of, for example, New Jersey. On this
reading, neither a state nor the confederation could discriminate
against alien residents. As we have seen, petitioning had come to be
regarded as a right, one which entailed an immunity from prosecution
if exercised. Thus, Delaware could not prosecute a free resident alien
for petitioning if, at a minimum, it could not prosecute its own citizens
or if the immunity was one of "free citizens in the several States,"' 96
which, of course, it was. Article IV, of course, never mentioned the
right to petition explicitly-it did not create a right where none had
previously existed. Nonetheless, to the extent that the right to peti-
tion was recognized by any state, that state could not then discrimi-
nate in its application of the right by limiting application of the right
to its own "free citizens."
From the point of view of the Confederation, the virtues of non-
discrimination were considerable. Through petition, non-discrimina-
tion gave free alien residents access to the mechanisms of government,
with all the political protection and access to redress of private griev-
ances and claims that the right to petition entailed. Moreover, given
the social reality of a relatively fluid population and the stated goal of
"mutual friendship,"'197 this clause was designed to prevent state ac-
tions that might precipitate violent conflict among the confederated





republics. As the historian Jack Greene has noted, "longstanding
fears of internal division and disunion ... and the perceptions of di-
versity that underlay them were not quickly dissipated once united
resistance had begun in the mid-1770s."'I9 Those fears and percep-
tions were palpable. Even the dedicated proponent of the union, John
Adams, betrayed both his own parochialism and his fear of parochial-
ism in November of 1775, writing, "The Characters of Gentlemen in
the four New England Colonies differ as much from those in the
others ... as much as [in] several distinct Nations almost. Gentlemen,
Men of Sense, or any Kind of Education in the other Colonies are
much fewer in Proportion than in N. England ... ."199 The non-dis-
crimination clause thus protected free inhabitants from retaliation
when their exercise of rights, including the petitionary right, might
provoke such a parochial response, one which might in turn trigger
interstate conflict.
Nonetheless, the class of individuals protected was, at least on pa-
per, far more circumscribed than the actual body of petitioners had
been in the colonies or continued to be in the states. While all "free
citizens" of the "several States" could consider themselves possessed
of the right to petition, of aliens only the "free" and actual "inhabit-
ants ''2° could claim the right under the Articles. Presumably, in addi-
tion to the deliberately excluded "paupers, vagabonds and fugitives
from justice,"2 ' at a minimum, slaves and transients could not claim
protection under the Articles should states discriminate and prosecute
them for their petitions. The implications for interstate commerce and
comity on the delicate issue of slavery are obvious.
Where the Articles directly mention the right to petition rather than
subsuming it in with rights generally, it is neither a matter of individ-
ual freedom nor state activity, but rather a peculiar quasi-judicial
mechanism for resolution of "all disputes and differences.., between
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other
cause whatever. 2 0 2 The historical significance of this clause is enor-
198. Greene, supra note 86, at 159.
199. Letter from John Adams to Joseph Hawley (November 25, 1775), quoted in
Greene, supra note 86, at 159.
200. Articles of Confederation art. IV. While the term "free" would, on its face,
appear to have excluded slaves, dependent status did not necessarily deprive one of
the protection. The definition of citizenship was a matter for the states, as was the
definition of the status of freedom and degree of residency. Nonetheless, as James
Kettner has noted, states made "allowances for married women and infants," whose
dependency, while not exactly rendering them unfree, enormously complicated any
understanding of the choice to become a citizen or inhabitant of a given state. James
H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, at 198 (1978).
Kettner does not address the status of free blacks in the Confederation.
201. Articles of Confederation art. IV.
202. Id. art. IX. The Articles thus stand in striking contrast to the Constitution,




mous. Several states-New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vir-ginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia-claimed land west of
the Appalachians. Those claims conflicted. Moreover, the interests of
the six states without such claims was, of course, in preventing the
ones with claims from gaining wealth and population, hence power, to
the diminution of their own influence. The petitioning mechanism for
resolving a given state's grievance had the benefit of providing a fa-
miliar device as a solution to a novel problem, the peaceful resolution
of territorial claims within a confederation. It obtained the additional
benefit of the imprimatur of legitimacy conveyed by a mechanism the
violation of which was so firmly at the center of Revolutionary pas-
sion. And, of course, the elaborate mechanism set up to resolve the
disputes-embodied in the longest paragraph in the longest article in
the entire document-was scrupulously designed to give the grievance
fair hearing.2 °3
The Articles of Confederation was, of course, a charter for a gov-
ernment of extremely limited powers. Hence, it should be unsurpris-
ing that few would have concerned themselves with federal
encroachment on the right to petition-the Articles provided few such
opportunities-much less with a federal guarantee that the states
honor such a right where their own citizens or inhabitants were con-
cerned. While the state constitutions were considered the guarantors
of the rights of the citizens and inhabitants of the states, they had no
effect beyond their own jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the cession of
claims of western lands left many Americans citizens of the United
States, but not of any particular state. How could they then claim
their rights? And, how important was petition among them, especially
if residents of the western lands forfeited the protection of the states?
Securing the frontier settlers' rights was, in part, a matter of negoti-
ation between the states and the federal government. By resolution,
the Congress pledged in October, 1780 that the western lands would
become republican states, receiving the same guarantees of sover-
eignty that each of the original thirteen had obtained. That year, New
York relinquished its claims, though not until 1800 did Connecticut,
the last to give up a claim, cease to claim the Western Reserve. In
1784, Thomas Jefferson, following Virginia's cession, introduced an or-
dinance providing for the governance of ceded territories. The resolu-
tion failed, in part because it provided for the abolition of slavery in
ceded lands after 1800. It was, however, the first precursor to the
203. The same article required that "[alIl controversies concerning the private right
of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States... shall on the petition of
either party to the Congress of the United States" be decided by the same type of
mechanism. Articles of Confederation art. IX. As vith interstate disputes, such "con-
troversies" are also completely judicialized in the Constitution, in Article III, Section
2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established the system of territo-
rial government for ceded land northwest of the Ohio River.
The Northwest Ordinance, while embodying a bill of rights which in
some ways prefigured the Bill of Rights, and which contained many
provisions that were also in contemporary state constitutions and dec-
larations of rights, contained no provision for the right to petition.
The preamble to the Ordinance's "articles of compact" consisted of
fourteen sections which provided "for extending the fundamental
principles of civil and religious liberty" ' 4 through the "unalterable" 0 5
provisions of the Articles.
Articles I and II laid out the rights that "person[s] 20 6 and "inhabit-
ants '207 could claim, petition not among them. The exclusion of the
right to petition from the governing ordinance of the territory, juxta-
posed with the language of Section 13 of the preamble, suggests that
in little more than a decade the right to petition had moved from the
core to the periphery, if not beyond, in the universe of American
political thought. Even, if that observation overstates the case, and I
think it does, 0 8 it is nevertheless indicative of the changes in political
reality that would transform the right in the years after the adoption
of the Constitution.
2. The State Constitutions
Gordon Wood has suggested that "Nothing - not the creation of
th[e] confederacy, not the Continental Congress, not the war, not the
French alliance - in the years surrounding the Declaration of Inde-
pendence engaged the interests of Americans more than the framing
of these separate [state] governments. 2 0 9 The fantastic intensity that
the colonists brought to the project of developing their republics was
focused not just on the creation of the machinery of government, but
also, if not more so, on the articulation of mechanisms that would en-
sure the participation of the citizenry in the activities of government.
Thus, the clauses designed to preserve freedom and promote reasoned
decisions by the government were drafted amidst an unprecedented
204. An Ordinance For the Government of the Territory of the United States
Northwest of the River Ohio paras. 13-14 (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 Federal and
State Constitutions, supra note 92, at 957 [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance].
205. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 204, § 14.
206. Id. art. I.
207. Id. art. II.
208. In part, the observation overstates the case because, in their first state consti-
tutions, the states formed from the ceded lands all provided for the right either di-
rectly or in synonymous terms. See Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 19; Ind. Const. of
1816, art. I, § 19; Mich. Const. of 1835, art. I, § 20; Minn. Const. of 1857, art. I, § 16;
Ohio Const. of 1802, art. VIII, § 19; Wis. Const. of 1848, art. I, § 4. Of course, the
political and constitutional centrality of the right and its exercise changed dramati-
cally, at least at the federal level, over those decades.
209. Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 128.
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popular discussion of the ideas of representation, sovereignty, power,
and the public good.
It would, of course, overstate the case to suggest that in that atmos-
phere the right to petition was the foremost concern of the drafters of
the state constitutions. Nonetheless, petitioning presented the draft-
ers with not just its own history on which to draw, but also with new
and subtle wrinkles in the theoretical constitutional fabric.
Some of the states, such as Delaware, set out the guarantee early
and simply: "That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature
for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner."210
This simple declaration in Section 9, however, embodied a number of
understandings about politics key to the new state government. First,
the clause is apparently universal in application: Everyone in Dela-
ware enjoyed the right.21 This universality reflected not just colonial
experience and Delaware's relatively flattened social hierarchy (com-
pared to England), but also the aspirations of popular participation2 12
and widespread protection 21 3 that the colonists expected in and of
their government.
As important as the breadth of the class of individuals in which the
right was recognized is the body named to receive the petitions. That
the right extended to petitions to "the Legislature" did not mean that
the petitioning of other branches of the state government was barred
or left unprotected.2"4 Rather, the Delaware Declaration's provision
210. Delaware Declaration of Rights § 9 (1776), reprinted in I Bernard Schwartz,
The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 276, 277 (1971) [hereinafter Delaware
Declaration]. Maryland adopted an identically worded provision in its Declaration of
Rights on August 14, 1776. Constitution of Maryland, A Declaration of Rights, & C.
§ XI (August 14, 1776), reprinted in 3 The Federal and State Constitutions, supra note
92, at 1686, 1687. The state constitution itself was adopted the same day. Id. at 1701.
211. The use of the term "man" should probably not be taken to mean only males.
While several other sections of the Declaration of Rights define their scope by using
the terms "people," "persons," or "every member" rather than "every man," see, e.g.,
Delaware Declaration, supra note 210, §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, the term "man" is in this
context ambiguous. Section 2 of the Declaration, for example, provides "That all men
have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dic-
tates of their own consciences and understandings ... ." Id. § 2. Reading that clause
to apply only to males would cut against all colonial experience. On the other hand.
to read section 6, which provided for "the right in the people to participate in the
Legislature" as allowing women to hold elective office would be equally out of sync
with experience. Suffice it to say that the clause should be read as if the drafters knew
a world of overwhelmingly male participation in politics, but that the colonists had
experienced female petitioners. That is, the drafters did not think in gender catego-
ries, but their assumptions are clear. Those assumptions, however, should not be read
to obviate the, albeit limited, experiences at odds with their assumptions.
212. See, e.g., id § 6.
213. See, e.g., id § 10.
214. Indeed, the Constitution of Delaware, adopted within a few days by the same
convention that adopted the Declaration, provided in Article 25:
The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has
been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in force, un-
less they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only
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represents both the republican faith in the legislature and the central
role accorded that body in republican thought.21 Indeed, the Dela-
ware Consitution suggests just how central the state legislature was.
Section 8 of the Declaration of Rights provides, "That for redress of
grievances, and for amending and strengthening of the laws, the Legis-
lature ought to be frequently convened. ' 216 The Delaware convention
thus saw the legislature as the primary governmental body for resolv-
ing the people's grievances. That the legislature need meet often to
amend existing law appears as a secondary matter. Moreover, the jux-
taposition of sections 8 and 9 and the echo in wording allow the infer-
ence that petition would be the key mechanism, because no others are
mentioned, to trigger a core legislative function.
Delaware was hardly unique in this respect. Pennsylvania, in 1776,
and Vermont, in 1777, adopted identically worded-though differently
punctuated-provisions guaranteeing the right to petition.21 7 Drafted
more broadly than Delaware's, each constitution recognized the right
in the "people" of the state. The right to petition was bundled with
other, correlative rights, notably assembly and consultation. Of the
two state constitutions, Vermont's is the more emphatic and less sus-
ceptible to disaggregation of the bundled rights. Whereas the Penn-
sylvania declaration used a comma to separate popular assembly and
consultation from the rights to "instruct their representatives, and to
apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition,
or remonstrance, ' 218 Vermont did so with a dash,2 19 suggesting that
assembly and consultation would be preserved in service to communi-
cation with governing officials, allowing a more overtly political cast
to the rights. Also important, when compared with the Delaware con-
stitution, was the breadth of communications covered in the other two
constitutions. Delaware, it should be recalled, mentioned only "peti-
tion," and petition "in a peaceable and orderly manner" at that.220 By
contrast, Pennsylvania and also Vermont, in addition to providing for
the right to instruct representatives, provided for communication by
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this con-
stitution, and the declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.
Constitution of Delaware (1776), reprinted in 1 Federal and State Constitutions, supra
note 92, at 562, 566-67. Reading the non-repugnancy clause, much less the provisions
continuing English law, as limiting the right to petition would be nonsense in the
context of the Revolution. Maryland also adopted a similarly worded clause. See
Constitution of Maryland, a Declaration of Rights, &c. § III (August 14, 1776), re-
printed in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 92, at 1686, 1686-87.
215. See Shalhope, supra note 150, at 88; Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 162-63.
216. Delaware Declaration, supra note 210, § 8.
217. Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, reprinted in 1 Bernard Schwartz,
The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 262 (1971) [hereinafter Pennsylvania
Declaration]; Vermont Declaration of Rights, 1777, reprinted in Schwartz, supra, at
319, 324 [hereinafter Vermont Declaration].
218. Pennsylvania Declaration, supra note 217, § XVI.
219. Vermont Declaration, supra note 217, § XVIII.
220. Delaware Declaration, supra note 210, at § 9.
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"address" and "remonstrance" and required, at least constitutionally,
neither peace nor order in delivery.21
Under English common law and statute, only documents that quali-
fied as petitions were protected from formal political retaliation by
governmental authorities. And, at various times, the number of per-
sons who could gather or sign the document was limited. And, too,
petitions were a particular kind of communication and embodied ex-
pectations of hierarchical deference. This historical baggage was jet-
tisoned by Pennsylvania and Vermont. They allowed not just
petitions, but addresses and even remonstrances, often the very an-
tithesis of polite, deferential, political communication. While both
Pennsylvania, with its large Quaker population, and Vermont, with its
peculiar relationship with the constituted political authority of Massa-
chusetts and New York, might be suspected of countenancing a wary
attitude towards authority generally, these constitutions represent the
first clear statements of the inversion of political hierarchy that would
transform the right to petition.
Those who governed the people, most of all the legislators, were to
be not the people's "betters," but their servants. The old hierarchy of
deference should, therefore, no longer obtain. To be sure, elected rep-
resentatives were due respect, but not obeisance. '  Hence, petition-
a prayer to superior authority-was augmented twice. It was aug-
mented not just by address-speech among equals-but also remon-
strance-reproof. Reproof, of course, was not on the order of a
221. Pennsylvania Declaration, supra note 217, at § XVI, Vermont Declaration,
supra note 217, at § XVIII. North Carolina's Declaration of Rights, however, was less
explicit, protecting the right "to apply to the Legislature," but omitting the require-
ments of peace and order. Constitution of North Carolina, A Declaration of Rights,
&c. § XVIII, reprinted in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 92, at 2787,
2788.
222. The New Hampshire and Massachusetts constitutions provide the strongest
evidence that respect had replaced deference. Massachusetts provided in 1780:
The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to
consult upon the common good; give instructions to their representatives,
and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or
remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they
suffer.
Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pt. I,
art. XIX (1780), reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 92, at 1888,
1890. Massachusetts required order and peace, but provided for "instruction" and
styled the objects sought in communication with the legislature -requests," rather
than prayers. Id. The capacity both to instruct and request suggests an equality of
position, but also a recognition of the need for legislatures to deal with many issues,
including requests (which might sometimes conflict). That the requests could be de-
livered in addresses or remonstrances reinforces the inference of equality between the
public and the legislator. New Hampshire's provision is identical, save for a minor
punctuation change and the omission of "address." Constitution of New Hampshire
Pt. I, art. 1, § XXXII (1784), reprinted in 4 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note
92, at 2453, 2457. The New Hampshire constitution of 1776 had no bill of rights. See
id. at 2451, 2451-53.
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reproof to one's houseservant, but was not in any sense a sign of ser-
vility. Buried in these terms, however, was the end of classic petition-
ing. For, if petition depended not on the hierarchical bonds of
political society for its effect, but on the capacity to deal with one's
representative as an equal, or even to treat the representative as a
servant, then some mechanism other than hierarchy must make the
members of government responsive to the petitioner. If equality, em-
bodied in address, or superiority, embodied in instruction and remon-
strance, correctly described the relationship, exactly what gave that
power to the addressor, the instructor, or the remonstrator? Only one
source gave an individual that power, the franchise.
B. Constitution- Creation and Adoption
Perhaps, by 1787, revolutionary romanticism and rhetoric having
faded with the draining realities of lengthy war and state building, the
concerns embodied in the Declaration passed into memory. 23 Per-
haps the limited legislative powers of the Confederation Congress
minimized the focus on the role petitions had played in creating legis-
lation in the minds of the Constitution's drafters. Perhaps, following
the structure of many of the state constitutions, petitionary activity
was considered a right which, while integral to governing, was not ac-
tually part of the structure of government and was therefore not in-
cluded in the mechanisms created by the original Constitution.
Perhaps the protections embodied in both the state constitutions and
the Northwest Ordinance rendered mention of petition superfluous in
their minds.224 Whatever the reason, and there are no clues available
in our records of the Constitutional Convention, 5 petitioning was not
mentioned in the text of the original Constitution presented for
ratification.226
The Declaration was revived as a partisan weapon during and after
the ratification. 7 The connection between the Declaration and the
Anti-Federalist opposition to a Constitution without a Bill of Rights
may be more than a matter of revolutionary rhetoric on the one hand
and partisan polemic on the other. As far as the right to petition is
concerned, however, it at least may be said to have come to have
prominence of place. It is the capstone grievance of the Declaration,
as well as the capstone right of our First Amendment, the one that
leads the amendments that were eventually ratified and became
known as the Bill of Rights.
223. One historian describes this as "a period of almost total neglect" of the Decla-
ration. See Ryerson, supra note 173, at 9; see also Maier, supra note 173, at 160-70.
224. This possibility, however, seems unlikely. See Maier, supra note 173, at 196.
225. At least I have found none.
226. All of which is not to say it was not considered by some, including George
Mason and James Madison. See Maier, supra note 173, at 194-96.
227. Id. at 170.
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Akhil Amar has recently reminded us that our First Amendment
was not the first one proposed3m And, while the amendments
adopted protect rights, hence the name, they may have been written
with more in mind. As Amar puts it, the original first amendment, for
example, "sounds primarily in structure." 9
If, as Amar believes, the juxtaposition of the phantom first two
amendments and our current First Amendment suggests that our First
Amendment speaks not just to rights but to issues of "attenuated rep-
resentation," 0 we ought to be attentive to the concepts of represen-
tation embodied in the petition clause. Moreover, we should be open
to an historical explanation that involves not just a modern process-
based understanding of the structure of government, but also one that
suggests the substantive breadth of the right.
The period from the Revolution through the adoption of the Con-
stitution, and especially the Bill of Rights, reflects debate about par-
ticipation in government, a debate which is relevant to understanding
the evolution of the right to petition. At one end were some thor-
ough-going democrats, who ended by generally siding with the Anti-
Federalists. Closer to the core of American politics were the Anti-
Federalists who opposed the Constitution, especially in its unamended
form, and were vigorous proponents of amendments to secure the
people's rights. Their arguments for including the right to petition
among the enumerated rights protected by the amendments sketch
out some of the tensions inherent in the inclusion of the petition right
in a regime of popular sovereignty. Those closest to a democratic sen-
228. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. 1131,
1137 (1991).
229. Id He argues that the assembly and petition clauses while -obviously pro-
tect[ing] individuals and minority groups... [are] also an express reservation of the
collective right of We the People to assemble in a future convention and exercise our
sovereign right to alter or abolish our government by a simple majority vote." Id. at
1152 (emphasis omitted). I agree with Professor Amar that "the clauses contain a
majoritarian core that contemporary scholarship has virtually ignored." Id. What
scholars have ignored, however, is not just the potential for peaceful revolution by
convention, which Amar emphasizes, but the day to day expectation of potential in-
volvement in the governmental process and structure embodied in the petitioning
process, at which he only hints. Id. at 1156.
If Aimar is right-as I think he is in some very important ways-that we must think
not just metaphorically, but literally and pervasively about the sovereign constitu-
tional authorship of We the People, then the key historical question is why the open-
ing words of our First Amendment are aimed at the legislative branch of the
government: "Congress shall make no law .... I have argued, thus far, that the
right to petition was seen as protecting the constitutive contributions of potentially all
elements of society. Given that the Confederation period concluded with a backlash
against the excesses of state legislatures, where disproportionate power had been
lodged by state constitutions, we should not be surprised that the amendment explic-
itly singles out the legislative branch of the new (and more powerful) federal govern-
ment for its prohibition for it was the legislature which, during the Confederation,




sibility were, not surprisingly, from Pennsylvania, the state with the
most radical of all the state constitutions.
Paradoxically, it was the Pennsylvanian Anti-Federalists who noted
most eloquently that the Revolution had upset the symmetry in social
and political hierarchy. For the Anti-Federalists, petitions-and their
reception by the Pennsylvania ratifying convention-served as both a
cautionary example and a subject of constitutional controversy. Phi-
ladelphiensis, in a broadside to the citizens of the state, began by not-
ing that the convention "rejected the petitions of the people . . .
against the adoption of the new constitution" with "contempt and ob-
loquy," its members seeming, among other things, "lords and masters"
rather than "servants of the people."'" Rejection of the petitions in
this manner foretold that
days of a cruel Nero approach fast; the language of a monster, of a
Caligula, could not be more imperious. I challenge the whole conti-
nent, the well born and their parasites, to show an instance of
greater insolence than this, on the part of the British tyrant and his
infernal junto, to the people of America, before our glorious
revolution.232
From this cautionary tale of apparent tyranny Philadelphiensis drew a
clear lesson. He opposed a return to the deferential order of the colo-
nial era and sought to preserve the popular sovereignty born of the
Revolution.
How, then, did petitions fit into this new order? They became not
the prayers of supplicants, but the missives "of a free people [to] their
servants. ' '233 While in presenting petitions "[p]ropriety requires that
the people should approach their representatives with a becoming
humility," the "governors ... as their servants ... are ... bound to
observe decency towards them, and to act according to their instruc-
tions and agreeably to conscience."2 34 Respect replaced deference
and it ran both ways, as befitted a free people communicating among
themselves.
Anti-Federalists in other states echoed such sentiments. Thus, a
Maryland Farmer could put a decidedly egalitarian spin on English
history, rejecting the assertion that "bills of rights have always
originated from, or been considered as grants of the King or Prince,
and that the liberties which they secure are the gracious concessions of
the sovereign," such an assertion "betray[ing] an equal ignorance of
history and of law."'2 35 Rather, English rights were part of the English
231. Philadelphiensis, No. 5, reprinted in 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist 116 (Her-
bert J. Storing ed., 1981).
232. Id. at 117.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Essays by a Farmer (February 15, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Complete Anti-
Federalist 5, 10 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also To the Citizens of the State of
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constitution, the "rights of the people to be coeval with the govern-
ment" having been asserted by petition, "[tihe petition of right, which
came forward in the reign of Charles 1st." 6
While the Maryland Farmer waxed eloquent on the nature of rights,
others, repeating the general complaint that rights were insufficiently
secured by the Constitution," 7 added some specificity. In New Eng-
land, Samuel objected that it contained no "provision... for the peo-
ple or States, to petition or remonstrate, let their grievances be what
they will." 8 Centinel, too, noted that "petitioning or remonstrating
to the federal legislature ought not to be prevented . .. ."I'
While the failure to include protection for the right of petition was
not a concern over which the Anti-Federalist spilled much ink, as evi-
denced by the relatively few mentions it specifically received, it was
integral to the general scheme of rights they sought. After all, general
discussions of rights can hardly be fairly read to exclude the right to
petition, given English and colonial history, not to mention its even-
tual inclusion in what became the First Amendment. The failure of
the Anti-Federalists to discuss the fight at length indicates not its irrel-
evance, but rather quite the opposite-everyone assumed it was part
and parcel of the rights to be preserved. Certainly the Federalists,
those at the other end of the debate about representation, did not go
so far as to suggest a curb on the right. In the most famous pro-consti-
tutional propaganda of all, The Federalist Papers, the right receives
but one mention, and that mention is not negative.240 There is, so far
as I know, no evidence that opposition to the right reared up in the
ratifying conventions. Indeed, the evidence suggests, as I have noted,
an assertion of the right in a new key.
The democratic experience of the Confederation period led not to a
belief that petitioning was irrelevant, but instead renewed the ques-
tion of whether, as it were, the ante should be upped. Should peti-
tions become instructions rather than mere prayers? That is the tenor
of at least some Anti-Federalist rhetoric, as when Philadelphiensis
asked and answered his own question: "Is it improper for freemen to
New York (June 13 and 14, 1788), reprinted in 6 The Complete Anti-Federalist 108-09
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Note also that petition was the subject of an amend-
ment proposed within the Maryland ratifying convention. See Address of a Minority
of the Maryland Ratifying Convention (May 6, 1788), reprinted in 5 The Complete
Anti-Federalist, supra, at 98.
236. Essays by a Farmer, supra note 233, at 11.
237. See, e.g., Centinel, To the People of Pennsylvania, reprinted in 2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 143, 152 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
238. Essay by Samuel (January 10, 1788), reprinted in 4 The Complete Anti-Feder-
alist 191, 193 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
239. See Centinel, supra note 237, at 153.
240. See The Federalist No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,




petition for their rights? If it be; then I say that the impropriety con-
sisted only in their not demanding them."9241
The debate about instruction of representatives had, as Gordon
Wood has shown, its own rich history, one in which the distinction
between petition and instruction could end up being no more than
political choice.242 As with instruction, petition also raised important
questions about the nature of representation. The distinctions be-
tween instruction and petition emphasize key aspects of the debate.
Implicit in an instruction was its power to bind the representative
upon pain that "his constituents would most deservedly forfeit their
regard and all pretension to their future confidence.1243 That forfei-
ture of confidence meant that the representative would forfeit his of-
fice. A petition had no such binding force. Unlike petitions, perhaps
(indeed, quite probably) instructions emanated only from voters or
official bodies, hence their binding authority.
Although petitions, like instructions, "were confined largely to pa-
rochial and local concerns," 2" thus "inevitably blurr[ing]" the line be-
tween public and private,245 their legacy was quite different. Unlike
instructions, not only could they actually embody the voice of the
unenfranchised, rendering the obedience of the representatives prob-
lematic, their form spoke to a different type of representation. The
colonial experience had been one in which the petition presented ar-
guments and often the text for proposed legislation. Presentation of
argument and legislative proposals presupposes the possibility of de-
bate and amendment; instruction admits of neither possibility. Even
the success of petitioning as a legislative vehicle did not calcify the
process into rigid instructions. Given the particular legacy of the peti-
tion and counter-petition, it is hard to see how petitioning could have
merged permanently with instruction. Petitioning presumed a form of
virtual representation, quite apart from the notions of deference that
were so much a part of its history. Nonetheless, when Anti-Federalist
pressure made amendments to the Constitution inevitable, the rela-
tion between petition and instruction and the theories of representa-
tion they embodied was at the core of the debate over the meaning of
the final clause of the First Amendment.
The first Congress framed the amendments submitted to the states
for ratification. Its debates over the amendments are extraordinarily
intelligent, informed, dense, and allusive, as befits a Congress com-
prising many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and
241. Philadelphiensis, supra note 231, at 116; see also supra text accompanying note
234 ("to act according to their instructions").
242. Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 189.
243. Daniel Dulany, Considerations, in I Pamphlets of the American Revolution
608 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965), quoted in Wood, Creation, supra note 87, at 190.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 191.
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other luminaries of the period. Particularly is this true of the debate
over the Petition Clause, a rich distillation of theoretical and experien-
tial concerns.
The most striking aspect of that debate is how much it concerns the
efficacy of government and how little it concerns protecting the exer-
cise of the right-ample confirmation of Amar's observation about
the structural component of the amendment. Federalists, Madison
chief among them, sought to preserve the character of the government
created by the Convention in the face of the more democratic Anti-
Federalist sentiment. The Federalist task was the continual hair-split-
ting required of those who sought to preserve a government rooted in
the demos without turning over every governmental structure to pop-
ular control. Thus, the distinctions between ultimate and immediate
authority were wrought exceedingly fine. The issues of sovereignty-
popular sovereignty-and representation that had animated more
than twenty years' discussions of the relationship between citizen and
government replicated themselves in miniature in the debate over the
right to petition.
Reading the debates that took place on a Saturday in mid-August in
New York2 46 makes abundantly clear how centrally regarded the right
and the activity of petition were to American government. Paradoxi-
cally, the clarity comes not from a minute discussion of the place of
petitioning in the constitutional order, but rather from the absence of
that debate. Some of the various ratifying conventions had suggested
amendments to the Constitution that included versions of the petition-
ary right. Indeed, the text presented for debate was a proposal that
the Fifth Amendment read, "The freedom of speech, and of the press,
and of the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for
their common good, and to apply to government for the redress of
grievances shall not be infringed."247 It does not use the term "peti-
tion," substituting instead "apply." While I have found no explana-
246. Congress, though mandated to keep a journal, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, did
not keep an official transcript of its debates until much later (1873). We rely on what
has become an unofficial record, Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress,
and other renditions of the debates published contemporaneously in newspapers.
Through the good offices of the First Federal Congress Project, we have had those
sources collected and printed in the Documentary History of the First Federal Con-
gress of the United States of America. The degree to which the sources differ, not just
in detail, but in emphasis and tone, suggests an equivalent degree of caution in treat-
ing any single version as authoritative. In my discussion, I will cite to the most de-
tailed version and, where other versions differ materially, shall include those also in
my references, indicating the difference.
247. Gazette of the United States, 19 August 1789 [hereinafter Gazette], reprinted in
11 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of
America, March 4, 1789 - March 3, 1791, at 1257 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Documentary History]. Both The Daily Advertiser and Gales &
Seaton's History of Debates in Congress render the proposed amendment with a
comma between "grievances" and "shall." Gales & Seaton's History of the Debates in
Congress 759 (Aug. 15, 1789) [hereinafter Gales & Seaton]: The Daily Advertiser, 17
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tion for the substitution, at least three possibilities suggest themselves.
First, consistent with the character of Anti-Federalist ideology and
politics, the substitution could represent a rejection of the deferential
and hierarchical legacy of petition and an infusion of a more demo-
cratic and egalitarian tone. Second, and not exclusive of the first, "ap-
ply" could be meant to encompass a wider sphere of communication
than simply petitions. As we have seen, the contemporary under-
standing was that a petition was a particular and formal type of com-
munication. Had the drafters sought protection for all types of
communication with the government without jettisoning the narrower
legacy that protected only petitions, arguably "apply" accomplished
that goal. Third, "apply" could signal not an Anti-Federalist, but a
Federalist, politics. As we shall see, the Anti-Federalists simply as-
sumed the right of petition and sought to constitutionalize the power
to instruct the representatives. "[A]pply" could simply be Federalist
language designed to preempt that move by expanding and democra-
tizing the right to petition. 48
In any case, within minutes that question was shunted aside as Rep-
resentative Tucker from South Carolina moved to amend by inserting
"to instruct their representatives. '" 2 49 The real debate was on. As the
reporter for the Daily Advertiser noted, though he rendered a highly
truncated version for his readers, "On this motion a long debate
ensued.12 5 0
Opponents to the amendment rose immediately. Representative
Hartley of Pennsylvania, calling instruction a "problematical subject,"
and alluding both to English and to recent local experience with in-
structions, worried about instructions arising from "the popular mind
... in a state of fermentation and incapable of acting wisely. 2 51 The
editors at the First Federal Congress project clarify the allusion: "The
right of county conventions to instruct members of the legislature had
been an issue in the early stages of Shay's Rebellion. '2 12
August 1789, reprinted in 11 Documentary History, supra at 1254 [hereinafter Daily
Advertiser].
248. Of course, a fourth possibility exists. The change in language could have no
meaningful content whatsoever. For obvious reasons, I deeply doubt that possibility.
249. Cong. Reg. (15 August 1789), reprinted in 11 Documentary History, supra note
247, at 1263. Gales & Seaton render it "Representatives." Gales & Seaton, supra
note 247, at 761. The Daily Advertiser, 17 August 1789, noted where to insert the
amendment, between "common good" and "to." Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at
125.
250. Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1254.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1264 n.13. Their clarification is partially confirmed by the version of the
debate in Gales & Seaton in which Elbridge Gerry says, following Tucker's announce-
ment that he will move to amend to include instruction, "[I]t had been abused in the
year 1786 in Massachusetts .... " Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 760. Although
"it" may refer to the right to assemble, the timing of the remarks assists our under-




Representative Hartley spoke for all Federalists, who, also alluding
to instruction's troubled history," 3 sought to avoid making the legisla-
ture captive to the "passions"" of the people, especially when that
passion was momentary or fleeting. 5 Passion, explicitly specified
and embodied in instruction, could become and often was the instru-
ment of "party" and faction, thus divisive of the common good." 6
Specifically, on some issues, how could local instructions, emanating
from one state, or worse, one district,2-s be thought to be commensu-
rate with the good of the nation as a whole?" s Almost as bad, in-
struction could also embody "error"" 9 with similar negative results.
With that legacy, and with such attendant potential for trouble, why
should the "wisest" be "embarrassled]" by such instructions?2z The
answer, said instruction's proponents, was simple and involved both
theoretical and practical concerns. They argued that instruction was
Instructions were attempts by local meetings or by institutions claiming to
represent the community to bind the community's representative to vote one
way on an issue. Town meetings could vote instructions; so could informal,
ad hoc caucuses, even county courts. When instructions were issued, the
instructors expected their assembleymen to give up his right to independent
consideration of the issue, his right, as one legislator put it, to follow the
dictates of my own conscience and understanding. Instructions were there-
fore controversial; they allowed legislators to claim direct representation of
the people, but they took from the legislators the ability to decide their vote
on the basis of wider information than was available to their constituents.
Earler, local institutions might instruct a representative on a purely local
question on which he was serving as "attorney" for the community. But in
the eighteenth century, instructing might involve binding a representative's
vote on a colonywide issue before he had heard arguments from the rest of
the colony. Exactly when and how the second kind of instruction developed
is not clear. Certainly Pennsylvania and Massachusetts voters were so in-
structing by the 1720s. In 1727, Morris was defeated for reelection from Phi-
ladephia, supposedly for defying instructions .... By the early 1750s, the
Virginia Burgesses were debating instruction as if their existence had long
been taken for granted.
Olson, supra note 19, at 554-56 (footnotes omitted).
253. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761-62; see also Cong. Reg., supra note
249, at 1265 (noting that the question of instruction "has been considerably agitated
... [i]n England"); Gazette, supra note 247, at 1258 (illustrating disagreement between
representatives); Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1254 (observing that instruction
was "a problematical subject").
254. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265;
see also Gazette, supra note 247, at 1258 ("[Tlhis was a dangerous article...."); Daily
Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255.
255. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 762: Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1266.
256. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1265; Gazette, supra note 247, at 1257-58; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255.
257. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1265; Gazette, supra note 247, at 1257-58; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255.
258. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1265.
259. Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255.
260. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 762; Cong. Reg.. supra note 249, at 1266.
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intimately connected with representation, the very embodiment of
what popular sovereignty was all about.261 And, to twist the patriotic
knife, they added that, while instructions might be incompatible with
monarchicalism, as found in England, surely those sentiments animat-
ing Revolutionary America could not be the same as in England.z62
Furthermore, instructions were a way, perhaps the best way, to convey
information from the populace to the representatives, 263 and, as El-
bridge Gerry noted, the sarcasm fairly dripping from his words, "I
hope we shall never shut our ears against that information which is to
be derived from the petitions and instructions of our constituents. ' '264
Wrong theory and wrong practice, retorted the Federalists. Repre-
sentation was a more complex matter than merely reflecting the popu-
lar will. Were that the case, why the need for a bicameral
legislature? 265 Indeed, why multiple representatives at all? 266 Multi-
ple representatives and bicameralism exist, the argument went, to pro-
tect against the evils of error and passion and instructions would
confound both of those institutional mechanisms. Representatives, af-
ter all, know the "interests and the circumstances of their constitu-
ents, ' 267 but are collected into two bodies not just to slow the
legislative process to combat passion and to check error, but to delib-
erate and to check each other's deliberations. 26
Instruction, then, was the enemy of deliberation, and not just be-
cause each state's or each district's parochialism might subvert the
common, national good. 69 Instruction also rendered deliberation su-
perfluous because the representative could do only what his instruc-
tions mandated.270 Better, said the Federalists, to avoid this problem
and take the advice and wisdom of the people through their speech
and the press, and, when they assembled among themselves and con-
veyed their grievances, through the time-honored method of peti-
261. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 762-63; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1266-67.
262. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 762-63; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1266-67.
263. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 765-66; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1269-70.
264. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 765-66; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1269-70.
265. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 763; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1267; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255; see also Gales & Seaton, supra note
247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265 (Representative Hartley).
266. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 246, at 763; Cong. Reg., supra note 248, at
1267; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255; see also Gales & Seaton, supra note
247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265 (Representative Hartley).
267. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265.
268. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 761; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1265.
269. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 766; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at
1270.




tion.271 Congress was meant to be not a "mere passive machine," but
rather a "deliberative body. ' '27  Petition would serve that end, in-
struction would destroy it.273 And, in the end, the amendment was
defeated.274 While the amendment proffered to the states and then
ultimately adopted included the right to petition, and not the rights to
"apply" or "instruct," the rejection of both terms suggests that the
traditional view of popular participation in governing had triumphed,
one in which widespread participation, even that of non-voters, was
anticipated, indeed welcomed, and taken as a foundational part of the
legislative process.'
III. PETITION'S PREMATURE DEATH NOTICE
With such experience as a guide, the early congresses naturally "at-
tempted to pass favorably or unfavorably on every petition. '2 76 Such
consideration did not last. Historians and other scholars have thus
concluded that petitioning met its demise soon after (or at least within
a few decades after) it was secured in the First Amendment. The vol-
ume of petitions Congress received may have contributed to the trans-
formation of the right.27 Indeed, the traditional explanation is that
271. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 766-67; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1270;
Gazette, supra note 247, at 1259; Daily Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1255-56.
272. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 763; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1267
(Representative Clymer).
273. The debate was punctuated by a discussion concerning whether instructions
would be binding and, if election were not the sole method to enforce the instruc-
tional mandate, whether the vote of a representative contrary to instruction would
count. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 767; Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1270-71.
Interestingly, at least one member felt that judicial review of the vote would be appro-
priate. Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 768 (Representative Stone); Cong. Reg.,
supra note 249, at 1272 (same).
274. See Gales & Seaton, supra note 247, at 777 (stating that the Congress ad-
journed); Cong. Reg., supra note 249, at 1280; Gazette, supra note 247, at 1260; Daily
Advertiser, supra note 247, at 1257.
275. Professor Amar has argued that the Petition Clause, read in conjunction with
other parts of the Constitution, empowers a majority of voters to require that a consti-
tutional convention be called. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amend-
ing the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1044, 1065 & n.81
(1988). While I believe that members of Congress would ignore such an obvious out-
pouring of public sentiment at their peril, whether expressed through petition or
otherwise, I also believe that the legacy of petition counsels against an interpretation
that would theoretically require Congress to do anything. The distinction is, however,
likely entirely academic, because any such expression of public sentiment would be
unlikely to be ignored.
276. Higginson, supra note 3, at 143.
277. On the other hand, nothing in the records of the first few Congresses suggest
anything of the kind. The editors of the Documentary History of the First Federal
Congress of the United States of America have compiled every petition submitted to
that Congress and chronicled the history of each one. See 7, 8 Documentary History
of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America (unpublished typescript
on file with author). Nothing in those records indicates that Congress was in any way
unable to deal with the flow of petitions. Similarly, a recent compilation by congres-
sional researchers suggests that the committee system as it developed was adequate to
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volume debased the right, precipitating its demise. So, no doubt, did
the flow of business generated in other manners contribute to the
transformation. Reasons exist, however, to doubt whether such
mechanical factors alone explain the eclipse of the right. Similarly,
while the controversy surrounding the antebellum gag rule covering
petitions dealing with slavery demonstrated that the right had lost its
central political importance, even slavery's inflammatory topicality
seems an insufficient basis on which to ground a claim for the demise
of the right.
Thomas Paine, revolutionary firebrand and thorough-going demo-
crat, presciently articulated what a democracy might come to think of
the right to petition. His invective came via indirection, however, in
his Rights of Man, which appeared in the early 1790s.27s His view of
the peripheral political nature of petitioning is, to twentieth century
ears, thoroughly modem. His apparent contempt seems a bit jarring,
however, only because political petitioning is of so little concern to-
day. In discussing English constitutionalism, Paine noted,
The act, called the Bill of Rights, comes here into view. What is it
but a bargain, which the parts of government made with each other
to divide powers, profits and privileges? You shall have so much,
and I will have the rest; and with respect to the nation, it said, for
your share, You shall have the right of petitioning.
This being the case, the Bill of Rights is more properly a bill of
wrongs, and of insult.2 79
Paine's faith was in democracy. The issues, to which he only alluded,
lie at the core of the transformation of petitioning's constitutional
meaning. Paine's sentiments about democracy put him at the edge of
American political thought, to be sure. Still, his vision of petition in a
more democractic political order was realized even before political ac-
tors were fully aware themselves of the change.280
handle the flow for the first few congresses. Indeed, the committee system was based,
at least in part, on the petitions submitted. See Staff of House of Representatives
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Petitions, Memorials and
Other Documents Submitted for the Consideration of Congress March 4, 1789 to De-
cember 14, 1795 (Comm. Print 1986).
278. 2 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (1792), reprinted in VI The Life and Works of
Thomas Paine 213, 296 (William M. Van der Weyde ed., 1925).
279. Id. at 296.
280. For example, the prosecution of Jedidiah Peck under the Sedition Act of 1798
for circulating a seditious petition was dropped not on constitutional grounds, but
because of its electoral effect. As one historian has noted, "[T]he Federalists realized
their blunder in arresting the popular Republican leader. Indeed, the Otsego Federal-
ists feared making the minister [Peck] a martyr, as his conviction could only
strengthen his prospects in the April election." James Morton Smith, The Sedition
Law of 1798 and the Right of Petition: The Attempted Prosecution of Jedidiah Peck, 35




The history of petitioning everywhere is marked by the efforts of
legislatures to deal with the flow of paper. The solutions replicate
themselves from body to body, from medieval Parliament through late
eighteenth century colonial assemblies. At first, the entire body re-
ceived and heard the petition, often in multiple readings. When, as
quickly became apparent, the volume of petitions both delayed read-
ing and constrained business generally, the number of readings dimin-
ished. Then the full body's initial hearing was eliminated and real
reception, following nominal reception by the full body, was given
over to a committee. 8 1 Other efforts-to cover expenses, authenti-
cate the petition, and the like-also followed.
The volume of petitions perpetually appears to astonish historians.
Not only, as I have noted, did petitions "dominate" the legislative
agendas, they were always, to judge from the descriptions of histori-
ans, about to overwhelm it. Like the perpetually rising middle class,
the ever-increasing "flood" of petitions is a truism to be treated with
some skepticism. In Connecticut, we are told, "commercial and dem-
ographic expansion" led to a "concomitant explosion of petitions."' 'z
In Pennsylvania, the 1720s saw a "notably large amount of petition-
ing, ' s3 while throughout the century, at least one subject "called forth
a tremendous amount of petitioning. '"81 Indeed, one researcher,
whose expectations were "far exceeded" by the "vast scope" of peti-
tions in various pre- and post-Revolutionary era colonies/states, says
the volume was so great that she was "precluded [from] full analy-
sis."" Why historians should not assume, and instead be surprised
that, in a relatively affluent, literate, and politically aware world, one
also populated with more than its share of dissenters and apparently
restless malcontents, petitions seeking redress would not be widely
used is not clear.
What is clear is that the rhetoric of inundation overstates the
case. 8 6 The only monographical work dealing with petitions concerns
Virginia. Colonial Virginia did experience a rise in the average
number of petitions per legislative session, amounting to more than a
tripling in number from 1701 until 1830.1 7 The rise, however, was far
281. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 35, at 23-64 (discussing the petition procedure in
colonial Virginia); Leonard, supra note 106, at 376-80 (discussing the petition proce-
dure in colonial Pennsylvania); Higginson, supra note 3, at 146-49 (discussing the peti-
tion procedure in colonial Connecticut); Smith, The Right to Petition, supra note 24,
at 28 (discussing the origins of procedures for private bills).
282. Higginson, supra note 3, at 148.
283. Leonard, supra note 106, at 377.
284. Id at 377 n.4.
285. Bogin, supra note 89, at 395-96.
286. See Tully, supra note 19, at 143.




from steady. And, for all the adjectives, the greatest number of peti-
tions never exceeded 317 (in 1790), of which 178 were of matters of
"Individual Concern." 8
Like the claims that an ever-rising docket threatens the imminent
overload and collapse of the Supreme Court, claims that legislatures
were about to be overwhelmed should be treated with a jaundiced
eye,;89 even-perhaps especially-when such claims were pro-
pounded by contemporary legislators (who might well have had other
axes to grind).2 9 ° As the Court has developed mechanisms to handle
its load, however imperfect they may be, so legislatures appear to
have coped with the strains imposed by various sources of work. 91
B. Slavery
More significant than volume, however, is subject matter. Even
Higginson, who attends to political context, stresses subject matter,
while alluding to volume, in his conclusion:
The abrupt defeat of a right so indispensable to the colonial legisla-
tive process has two explanations: first, the frailty of the right of
petition, a right uprooted from the social and political context in
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 1129 (4th
ed. 1991) ("The United States House of Representatives, having found itself inun-
dated with abolitionist petitions, adopted in 1836 a gag rule that limited acceptance of
those petition [sic]." (citing A.H. Kelly & W.H. Harbison, The American Constitu-
tion: Its Origins and Development 357-58 (4th ed. 1970) (emphasis added)).
290. Frederick relies on Russell B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the
Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860 (1963), for the claim that "the number of [abolitionist]
petitions increased from 23 to 300,000." Frederick, supra note 3, at 132 & n.91. Nye
misread his source, however. Nye's error was picked up and repeated in Samuel
Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and The Union 340 (1956). Nye and Bemis, both
eminent historians, thus gave currency to a vision of a petition flood of Biblical pro-
portions. Dwight Lowell Dumond, also an eminent historian, caught and corrected
their error. I defer to Dumond's correction of Messrs. Nye and Bemis:
These are the figures for the number of petitioners given by Birney in Corre-
spondence Between the Hon. F. J. Elmore, One of the South Carolina Delega-
tion in Congress, and James G. Birney, One of the Secretaries of the American
Anti-Slavery Society (New York, 1838), p. 65. These figures are incorrectly
cited as petitions instead of petitioners in Russell B. Nye, Fettered Freedom:
Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy (East Lansing, 1949), p. 37, and
are repeated by Samuel Flagg Bemis in John Quincy Adams and the Union
(New York, 1956), p. 340, with the statement that they "indicate only the
number of petitions, not the millions of signatures to them." There were, of
course, no such numbers of signatures on any petitions.
Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America 398-99
n.7 (1961). William Lee Miller also discusses the effort to calculate the actual number
of petitions and signatories. See William Lee Miller, Arguing About Slavery: The
Great Battle in the United States Congress 305-09 (1996).
291. Parliament, for example, coped. The nineteenth century saw many petition
campaigns directed to Parliament. While it received 33,898 petitions in 1843, it re-
ceived nearly as many in 1893, with yearly totals between half and two-thirds as many
occurring during each decade in between. See Leys, supra note 46, at 54 fig. 1.
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which its use had flourished, and second, more broadly, the assai-
lability of any principle, however fundamental, when confronted by
interests as entrenched as slavery. Transport a right from an alto-
gether different political culture into a period of intense political
antagonisms, and constitutional language and purpose are readily
subverted. The right to petition was ill-fitted to lawmaking in the
national legislature; but, perhaps more decisively, it had the misfor-
tune to become inextricably entangled in the slavery crisis.
2 92
He may be right. His work, however, like that of all other analysts,
points not to the "frailty" of the right, but its robustness. Moreover,
while petition may have been "ill-fitted to lawmaking in the national
legislature," '93 his work provides no evidence for that, rather than the
subject matter, claim. Slavery, it seems, was the juggernaut that
crushed the right.
Under Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, "Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.1 29 4 The First Amendment,
however, provides that, "Congress shall make no law... abridging...
the right of the people.., to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. ' 95 Those two sections of the Constitution came into di-
rect conflict in the years 1836 to 1844, as the House of Representatives
attempted to quell the rising number of abolition petitions its mem-
bers had been receiving. The attempts to stifle the petitions became
known as the gag rule or gag law. For eight years, the existence of the
rule was a source of tremendous controversy in the House and the
nation.2 9 6
The gag rule reveals, however, not that the debate concerning the
abolition of slavery doomed the right, but rather that the right had
already lost its earlier significance in American political culture. 29
Representative Pinckney, of South Carolina, the man who was to be
the chairman of the select committee which reported the first gag rule,
292. Higginson, supra note 3, at 165; see also Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, The Antislav-
ery Impulse 1830-1844, at 118 (reprint ed. 1957) (1933) ("Behind the windy, unreal
issues of constitutional abstractions were the living issues of party malevolence and
sectional conflict.").
293. Higginson, supra note 3, at 165.
294. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
295. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
296. The story of the debate over the gag rule has been meticulously chronicled
recently. See Miller, supra note 290. For a sophisticated treatment of the petition's
role in the controversies that led to the Civil War, see William W. Freehling, I The
Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (1990). The story of the gag rule
was once treated as a classic part of American constitutional history. See 2 H. von
Hoist, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States, 1828-1846 (John
J. Lalor trans., 1888).
297. Slavery was a topic of concern to petitioners from the earliest Congresses. See
William C. diGiacomantonio, "For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society" Anti-
slavery and Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. Early Republic
169, 170 (1995) (describing Quaker antislavery petitioners in the First Congress not in
ways in which petitioners were regarded in the colonies but "'as [an example of] the
first pressure group activists in the modem sense" (footnote omitted)).
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was not alone in voicing what was to be the position of the House of
Representatives for nearly a decade: "Hitherto we have been fighting
about mere abstractions. Hitherto we have been contending about
the right of petition, and other minor and unimportant points." 298 He
made his comment, notably, in 1836, when the constitutional contro-
versy began, not when it ended.
Abolitionism was, however, the reason for the gag rule. The rule
was the reaction of southern congressmen who felt that the South
could no longer bear the insults contained in the language and content
of abolition petitions. Designed to staunch the flow of such petitions
to the House, it was sweeping in its breadth. As first adopted on May
26, 1836, the rule and its preamble were to signal abolitionists that the
House of Representatives was not going to consider the subject of the
abolition of slavery and therefore it was superfluous to continue the
attempts to agitate the matter.
And whereas it is extremely important and desirable that the agi-
tation of this subject should be finally arrested, for the purpose of
restoring tranquillity to the public mind, your committee respect-
fully recommend the adoption of the following additional resolu-
tion, viz:
Resolved, That all petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions,
or papers, relating in any way, or to any extent whatever, to the
subject of slavery, or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being
either printed or referred, be laid upon the table, and that no fur-
ther action whatever shall be had thereon. 99
This seminal resolution was to be re-adopted in nearly identical forms
during the beginning of each session of Congress until finally made a
standing rule in 1840.300 The standing rule was not repealed until the
opening of the second session of the Twenty-eighth Congress, on the
resolution offered by John Quincy Adams."'
Unfortunately for the participants in the controversy, precious little
congressional precedent existed for the actions that were taken. What
precedent there was often had only minimal or tangential relevance to
the particulars of the adoption of a gag-rule. Nonetheless, the propo-
nents of the gag rule felt it incumbent upon them to forward some
precedent, lest they be regarded as constitutional innovators, with all
the dire consequences they felt such innovation might have when ap-
plied to slavery itself. As Southerners tended to lead the assault on
petitions, it was only natural that they would look to one of their he-
roes, Thomas Jefferson, for some guidance on the matter. Represen-
tative Glascock, of Georgia, noted that as Vice-President, while
298. 12 Cong. Deb. 2494 (1836).
299. Id. at 4052.
300. Barnes, supra note 292, at 110-11.
301. 12 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 116 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., 1877) [hereinafter Memoirs of John Quincy Adams].
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presiding over the Senate, Jefferson had allowed the question, "Shall
the petition be received?"30 Glascock reasoned that if Jefferson al-
lowed the question, then surely a legitimate, hence constitutional, re-
jection might be allowed. Indeed, "This question being adopted and
considered by Mr. Jefferson as a proper one," said Glascock, "left him
no ground on which even to doubt; and he felt no disposition to look
for right authority to sustain him in the views he had taken, or to
justify him in the course which he had pursued in relation to these
petitions."303 What Glascock unfortunately ignored was that Jeffer-
son's position dealt only with a single petition and the gag rule he and
his colleagues were then debating would provide for the automatic
tabling of an entire class of petitions, not allowing the House to con-
sider the question of reception.
In a similar vein, the Speaker of the House, James K. Polk of Ten-
nessee, used a Senate precedent to grant the propriety of considering
such a rule. Responding to Adams' query on the House's authority to
reject and thus refuse to consider a petition, the Speaker cited a stand-
ing eighteen-year precedent in the Senate allowing just such action.3°
Then, in a rather chauvinistic display, the Speaker rhetorically ques-
tioned Adams, asking if the House were a lesser assemblage than the
Senate, unable to set rules equivalent to those of the upper cham-
ber.3°5 As with Glascock's argument, however, the Speaker's decision
dealt only with single petitions, and not with a rule.
A strong case was made by Representative Cushing, of Massachu-
setts, that even the precedents cited by the Speaker and by Glascock
ran afoul of the meaning of the right of petition in its historical and
contemporary legal contexts. Beginning with the premise that peti-
tion for redress of grievances was a right that inhered with the people,
he began his rather lengthy discourse.3 °' That the right could even be
questioned was to him unimaginable. Citing the First Amendment, he
explored contemporary legal thought. While noting that Tucker's
Notes on Blackstone complained that the defense of the right was not
worded strongly enough within the amendment, he also acknowledged
that Story's Commentaries insisted that the right could not be denied
"until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had
become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of the
privileges of freemen. '30 7 That fundamental legal thinkers would
agree that non-reception was unconstitutional appeared to Cushing as
obvious.
302. 12 Cong. Deb. 2319 (1836).
303. kd
304. Id. at 2132.
305. Id.
306. 1d. at 2325.
307. Id. (quoting Story's Commentaries).
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Not satisfied with what he may have assumed others would regard
as transitory thoughts, he insisted that proper understanding of the
right of petition could be obtained only by exploring the "anterior
political history of the country."3 °8 Reminding the House that the
right of petition was embodied in an amendment, he reviewed the
states' demands at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 30 9
Massachusetts, he said, required an express declaration that powers
not specifically delegated to the federal government be reserved to
the states.310 That she did not demand the inclusion of a bill of partic-
ulars was due to the wording of her own constitution, which included a
strongly worded guarantee of the right of petition.311 Virginia, New
York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, however, all insisted upon
inclusion of a clause guaranteeing the right.3 12 Believing that the his-
tory of the United States was insufficient to impress the House, how-
ever, Cushing went one step farther. The tenets of Anglo-Saxon law
all required that a legislative assembly acknowledge the right of peti-
tion. In reviewing the history of Great Britain, Cushing even went so
far as to note that never had either of the Houses of Parliament re-
fused to receive petitions.313 It mattered not that many petitioners
had extreme prayers, even praying for "downright revolution in the
Government. '314 Their petitions had been received. Wondered
Cushing,
And shall the people in republican America, with its written consti-
tution for the protection of the public rights, and by a body of
strictly limited powers, shall the people here be forbidden to do that
which they may freely do in the monarchy of England, having no
guarantees for the public liberty except laws and prescriptive us-
ages, all of them confessedly at the will of an omnipotent Parlia-
ment? Forbid it reason! Forbid it justice! Forbid it liberty! Forbid
it the beatified spirits of the revolutionary sages, who watch in
heaven over the destinies of the republic!315
Cushing, of course, was not naive enough to believe that simply be-
ing correct in his historical interpretation would persuade the House.
If any precedents were to be at all relevant, they had to be ones di-
rectly from the House and squarely to the point. Only two direct
precedents had been cited in the debate and, while unable to point to
previous actions supporting the guarantee that petitions be received,
Cushing successfully eliminated the opposition's precedents. The first,
which had been cited by Representative Garland, of Virginia, pur-
308. Id. at 2326.
309. Id. at 2325.
310. Id. at 2326.
311. Id. at 2326-27.
312. Id. at 2327.





ported to affirm that in 1790 the House had rejected a memorial from
a group of Quakers that dealt with the slave trade.3 1 6 Research by
Cushing clearly showed that, in fact, the petition had been referred to
committee, and that the House journal was in error.3 1 7 Garland cour-
teously admitted his error.31 The only other precedent for rejecting a
petition was that of Vincente Pazos, of New Granada, in 1818.19
Cushing correctly noted what a weak precedent it was, pointing out
that Pazos was an agent of a foreign government and that his petition
constituted an appeal to the Congress from a decision of the
Executive.3 m
Because the House conflated its own history with the history of the
right, this aspect of the debate was resoundingly inconclusive. More
telling, however, were the ways in which all sides in the controversy
ignored the history of petition generally.
A prerequisite for serious consideration of a prayer had come to be
that the petition be signed only or primarily by those legitimately al-
lowed to request a redress of grievances. What "legitimately" meant,
of course, was the key question. The tendency, especially promoted
by the gag rule's proponents, was to delimit the sphere of individuals
whose prayers could properly be considered. In only one case, how-
ever, that of slaves themselves, did the House actually resolve that a
group did not have the right of petition. In all other cases, the peti-
tions signed by those considered illegitimate were disparaged or ig-
nored. Not only free blacks, but women and children were variously
assailed for stepping out of what was considered their proper role in
society, and they were especially assailed for stepping into a political
role.32' Many in the House of Representatives felt that only those
316. Id at 2328-29.




321. Historians interested in women's history have begun to explore the history of
women and petition in some detail. See, e.g., Lori D. Ginzberg, Women and the Work
of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United
States (1990); Deborah Bingham Van Broekhoven, "Let Your Names Be Enrolled:
Method and Ideology in Women's Antislavery Petitioning, in The Abolitionist Sister-
hood: Women's Political Culture in Antebellum America 179 (Jean Fagan Yellin &
John C. Van Home eds., 1994); Judith Wellman, Women and Radical Reform in Ante-
bellum Upstate New York. A Profile of Grassroots Female Abolitionists, in Clio Was a
Woman: Studies in the History of American Women 113 (Mabel E. Deutrich & Vir-
ginia C. Purdy eds., 1980) (chronicling the rise of women in the anti-slavery move-
ment). It is certainly true that some early feminists were conscious of the overtly
political character of women's role in abolition petitioning. See, e.g., Jean Fagan Yel-
lin, Women & Sisters: The Antislavery Feminists in American Culture 38-39 (1989)
(quoting and discussing Angelina Grimke's views on petitioning). It is a common-
place observation in women's history that involvement in petition campaigns
culminated in the suffrage movement. As Grimke noted, petition campaigns were a
training ground, at least at first, that made women conscious that they were and ought
to be playing an overt role in politics. Id.
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legally entitled to vote held the right of petition and further implied
that a petition signed by those unable to meet that qualification ought
to be ignored in direct proportion to the number of illegitimate signa-
tures on it.322
The issue of petitions made by blacks must necessarily be divided
into its two component parts, free blacks and slaves. Very few repre-
sentatives were willing to stand with Adams in his regard for African-
Americans as human beings, fully entitled to basic human rights.32 3
Most members of the House accepted the position that black persons
were inferior to whites and, as a natural consequence, it was thus per-
fectly acceptable to deny them some political rights. Representative
Bouldin, of Virginia, was hardly atypical in his racism. Not only did
he analyze in detail the physical differences of "race," but he went a
step or two further, reciting the commonly referred to condemnation
of Canaan in the Old Testament, using it as proof for his assertions
that blacks were, as a group, naturally ignorant and indolent.32 4 As
for any hope of blacks ever being brought up to the stature of the
white man, he said, "I cannot feel any serious hope of their ever being
brought up to that condition by man's agency. . . . Leave it to
God. '3 5 In response to arguments by northern congressmen, Repre-
sentative Pinckney, of South Carolina, author of the first gag resolu-
tion, summed up the point and addressed one northern congressman,
"Does not the gentleman know that the right of petition only attaches
to the free white people of the Union ... ?,326
Despite assertions that the right of petition did not inhere in the
black population, the House nonetheless received petitions signed by
blacks. The representatives were forced, despite claims that blacks
could not petition, to deal with the fact that some had petitioned and
that the petitions were presented by a handful of willing members of
the House. One member, Bouldin, said that a free black was no bet-
ter than a slave,327 which would have put free blacks in the position of
having their petitions not even received by the House. Another mem-
ber, Hammond, having envisioned the then fanciful proposition of
granting black men full political rights, said, "to see them placed at the
heads of your Departments; or to see, perhaps, some Othello, or Tous-
saint, or Boyer, gifted with genius and inspired by ambition, grasp the
presidential wreath, and wield the destinies of this great republic?,"
"[f]rom such a picture I turn with irrepressible disgust. '32 8 Such was
322. 12 Cong. Deb. 2531 (1836).
323. See Marie B. Hecht, John Quincy Adams: A Personal History of an Independ-
ent Man 552-54 (1972) (discussing Adams's regard for the humanity of blacks).
324. 12 Cong. Deb. 2231 (1836).
325. Id. at 2232.
326. 13 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, at 273 (T. H.
Benton ed., 1860) [hereinafter Abridgement].
327. 12 Cong. Deb. 2234 (1836).
328. Id. at 2458.
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the attitude of many members of the House. Representative Robert-
son closed the question in the debates of the first session of the
Twenty-fourth Congress when he claimed that emancipated slaves
were not citizens, ruling out an entire group of free blacks from ever
obtaining the full panoply of political rights.329
While the positions of the House in regard to free blacks may have
been ambivalent and its members' opinions divided, its position vis-A-
vis slaves was made emphatically clear. The great bulk of argumenta-
tion came in the debate on the censure of Adams, which followed his
attempts to question the Speaker about a "Petition from 22 Slaves."33
A large number of arguments were quickly advanced, most of them
not addressing whether slaves had petition rights. Representative Al-
ford immediately suggested that the petition be removed from the
House and burned.33 ' That suggestion was to set the violent tone of
the debate which followed. Representative Thompson, of South Car-
olina, said that Adams's attempt to present the petition was designed
to engender insurrection and mentioned that to do so was illegal, in-
toning that there were grand juries in the District of Columbia which
could handle such matters.332 Representative Granger, of New York,
merely advanced the assertion, without much explanation, that the at-
tempt to present the petition cheapened the right of petition. 33 His
was the least vituperative attack.3a
Following rancorous debate, the House adopted the position that
slaves, as property, lacked the right. Having failed on the Thursday
before to censure Adams, on Saturday, February 11, 1837, the House
adopted measures to prevent being forced to deal with such an un-
comfortable spectacle again. First, they disposed of the petition which
had been the basis for the uproar:
An inquiry having been made, by an honorable gentleman from
Massachusetts, whether a paper, which he held in his hand, purport-
ing to be a petition from certain slaves, and declaring themselves
slaves, came within the order of the House of the 18th of January,
and the said paper not having been received by the Speaker, he
stated that, in a case so extraordinary and novel, he would take the
advice and counsel of the House.
Resolved, That this House cannot receive the said petition with-
out disregarding its own dignity, the rights of a large class of citizens
of the South and West, and the Constitution of the United States.335
329. Id. at 4028.
330. 13 Abridgment, supra note 326, at 266.
331. Id. at 267.
332. Id. at 268.
333. Id. at 268-69.
334. Id. at 267-68.
335. Id. at 296.
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Immediately thereafter the House categorically denied slaves the right
of petition: "Resolved, That slaves do not possess the right of petition
secured to the people of the United States by the constitution. 336
Adams was not, however, to be defeated by a mere rule adopted for
reasons he felt unacceptable. He was to make reference to the fact
that the House had acted to deny one-sixth of the population of the
country the right of petition in his lengthy discourse on the right of
petition in the debate on the Texas question in 1838. 3 3 7 Later he was
to claim that much could be lost by ignoring that large a section of the
population.338 Ultimately, he would deny the House resolution itself,
warning the body that "he should have no hesitation in presenting a
petition from a slave, if his memorial was properly couched, and on a
proper subject, or something to this effect. 339
There was one ground upon which even Adams was willing to reject
petitions, the protection of the dignity of the House. Even he felt that
offensively worded petitions might be rejected. n The question of
language was, however, a very complicated one. To many, at least to
many other than Adams, the perception of some language as offensive
was often more a matter of the subjects the language referred to than
of the language itself. The distinction between the subject of the peti-
tion and its language was the object he sought. Therein lay the real
protection of the House. He did, however, use the language issue to
needle his opponents.
If objection to the reception of these petitions was placed upon
the ground that the language was disrespectful, as was intimated by
the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. Glascock,] that objection should
be entered on the journal. If the people should be apprized that this
was the objection, there would be petitions enough sent here, where
no objection of this sort could be urged.34'
Adams thus tried to make the only exception he would allow into an
argument for the right of petition.
The problem with allowing rejection of offensively worded petitions
was that, in the view of gag proponents, all abolition petitions were so
336. Id.
337. The Anti-Slavery Crusade in America: Speech of John Quincy Adams upon
the Right of People to Petition 58-59 (James M. McPherson & William Loren Katz
eds., Arno Press, Inc. 1969) (1838) [hereinafter Speech of John Quincy Adams]. The
effect of the speech has been carefully analyzed by historians and rhetoriticians. At
least one rhetoritician has disputed the importance that historians have attributed to
the address. See Jerald A. Banninga, John Quincy Adams on the Right of a Slave to
Petition Congress, 38 S. Speech Comm. J. 151 (1972).
Adams was, however, playing a game, albeit a deadly, serious one, with the House.
The petition from the slaves was a "trick," calling not for slavery's abolition, but its
continuation. See Miller, supra note 290, at 256.
338. Speech of John Quincy Adams, supra note 337, at 63-64.
339. Cong. Globe, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 474 (1838).
340. Speech of John Quincy Adams, supra note 337, at 24.
341. 12 Cong. Deb. 2321 (1836).
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worded.342 In their view, it was simply superfluous to present aboli-
tion petitions, as they would have to be rejected because the language
used in them was insulting. 3 Representative Bynum, of North Caro-
lina, with typical fiery oratory, "hoped the House would never consent
to bind up its own hands, so as to be incapable of defending itself, by
refusing to consider any insulting or otherwise dangerous communica-
tion, that might be incompatible with either its dignity or safety." 4 It
was evident that neither Adams nor the gag rule's proponents were
willing to let even the question of language be a neutral position. It
became simply another weapon with which to attack the opposition's
viewpoint.
The final question involved in the petition controversy was the duty
of representatives vis-A-vis the petitions they received. The Constitu-
tion does not specify that when petitioning for a redress of grievances
the petition be of a personal nature. Nonetheless, a large number of
members of the House felt it was not their duty either to present or
receive petitions of one class of people for another. While the deriva-
tive of such an idea would be that no one would ever be able then to
petition to aid slaves, as they were barred from petition themselves,
such niceties were ignored. Members were thus heard to argue fer-
vently that,
every people knew their own grievance best, and he thought it a
most extravagant claim, under this article, to assert that it gave the
right to one set of people to interfere with the rights of another, and
that Congress was bound to receive such petitions, and gravely act
upon them. The constitution meant (said Mr. G[arland]) no such
absurdity. 45
If Garland's was the position of the House, and his position was not
formally made so, then the members had a duty to screen the contents
of all petitions and judge whether the grievance was particular to the
signers. Few congressmen would have assumed such a burden.
A large number were willing to assume quite another burden, that
of simply not presenting petitions they did not like. Adams, of course,
felt obliged to present all petitions, except the offensively-worded
ones.3" His colleague from Massachusetts, Representative Cushing,
however, was one of the very few who agreed with him.- 7 No one
actually articulated the position that there was a duty not to present
petitions of some types. The papers of the members of the House
contain many petitions which were not presented and it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that many more, received by congressmen un-
342. See, e.g., idi at 2320, 2338-39, 2462.
343. Id at 2131, 2338.
344. Id. at 2132.
345. Id. at 2335.
346. See, e.g., 9 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. supra note 301. at 376.
347. 12 Cong. Deb. 2323 (1836).
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friendly to abolition, were simply discarded.348 If, however, a petition
was actually presented, the gag rule absolutely prevented any further
action on that petition. As so many of the abolition petitions after
1836 were merely political tools, that is probably all the consideration
the signers thought or hoped to receive.
Many others, however, actually wanted a response. The normal
course of petitions had been halted. They could not be debated,
printed, referred to committee, acted upon, or even read in full.
George Grennell, Jr., a Massachusetts congressman, wrote Robert
Leavitt on February 20, 1837, explaining to him the reality of the gag
rule's effects. He indicated that the gag rule "plays the hypocrite, -
pretending to respect the right of petition, it renders it nugatory and
worthless." '349
In the debate over the gag rule, the House thus thoroughly revealed
its members' political preconceptions. Gone long before the debate
began were the latitudinarian precepts of widespread participation,
openness of topic, and duty to hear. Only Adams, exemplar of the old
order, maintained such views. 350
After the House adopted the first gag rule, many abolitionists al-
tered the form of their petitions. These altered petitions departed sig-
nificantly from the classic petitions of the colonial era. In the first
place, they embodied none of the language that set forth the peti-
tioner's deferential attitude toward the legislature. In the second
place, they were short, deliberately short. They sought no real redress
as such. Rather, they were a publicity vehicle for the antislavery cause
and designed as such. Signers recognized that the petitions existed for
the purpose of linking antislavery, the crusade for human rights for a
class of individuals, to opposition to the gag rule, the fight to retrieve a
right once guaranteed to all. The linkage was designed to temper abo-
lition's radical image by contrasting it with the lengths to which slav-
ery's supporters might go to preserve the institution. It was also, of
course, an attempt to bring into abolition's fold political moderates
who might have had reservations about abolition, but whose support
for the right to petition was unreserved. Finally, the abolitionists
worked in concert with friendly congressmen to make certain that the
wording of a petition was brief enough that it could be read in its
entirety before a gag rule proponent could rise in objection to its re-
348. See Dumond, supra note 290, at 245.
349. Letter from George Grennell, Jr. to Robert Leavitt (Feb. 20, 1837), quoted in
James M. McPherson, The Fight Against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and Antislavery
Insurgency in the Whig Party, 1839-1842, 48 J. Negro Hist. 177, 178 (1963).
350. The Senate had undergone a similar, though less dramatic, conflict concerning
abolition petitions. See Miller, supra note 290, at 116-29. One reason it was less dra-
matic was that the Senate's leading players included no one like Adams. See generally
William L. Van Deburg, Henry Clay, the Right of Petition, and Slavery in the Nation's




ception. Petitions had thus become prototypes of the tools of mass
politics. Rather than vehicles for specific redress of grievances, they
were tools used to unite different political groupings, while at the
same time they were vehicles for political theater in the House. In
short, they were the sound bites of the early nineteenth century.
What is also apparent is that the classical conception of petition had
severely waned before debate on the gag rule began. Save for Adams
and Cushing, no member of the House championed the classical con-
ception of universal participation and unrestrained subject matter re-
quiring consideration for petitions so long as the petition was
sufficiently deferential. In its place, the gag rule proponents substi-
tuted a thoroughly liberal vision. They argued that the right was co-
extensive with voting. For its force, petitioning depended on the
number of potential voters who signed, hence the willingness to deny
the right to slaves and to ignore completely the petitions of free
blacks, women, and children. Brute political power grounded in the
franchise, rather than reciprocal obligation rooted in social and polit-
ical cohesion, underlay this vision. That vision enabled gag propo-
nents to field the corollary argument that, to the extent the House
lacked power to deal with slavery, the topic itself was outside the
scope of the right's protection, ignoring petition's English and Ameri-
can heritage as a legislative vehicle for expanding legislative power.
C. Transformation
In spite of the "flood" of petitions and even in spite of the corrosive
effects of slavery, petitioning was far from dead in the United States.
Like the demise of Samuel Clemens, reports of its death have been
greatly exaggerated. Nonetheless, during and after the nineteenth
century, distinctions between public petitions and private petitions be-
come more pronounced, and the role of petitioning at the state and
federal levels diverged somewhat. The nineteenth century witnessed
the continued use of petitions, and indeed witnessed other petition
drives. To be sure, none reached the sustained size of the abolition
drive, but the controversies surrounding women's suffrage, Mormon-
ism and the admission of Utah to statehood, and other similar issues
motivated tens of thousands of individuals to sign thousands of peti-
tions to Congress. These public petitions generally took the form of
those in the abolition controversy. Their wording was usually brief,
often abrupt. They were not instruments of deliberation or persua-
sion in themselves, but rather instruments of mass politics. Their sign-
ers did not seriously believe that the petitions really alerted Senators
and Representatives to a new issue or problem, nor did they believe
that the petitions really provided new information. Rather, they con-
veyed a political sentiment and not much else. When signed by voters,
the political pressure was obvious. When not, as when signed by wo-
men, the political pressure was of a different order and more indirect,
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though the moral appeal from the guardians of the archetypal family
was all the greater.351
The federal government received many petitions, however, on
purely private matters, especially if the records of the first few Con-
gresses is indicative. By the middle of the nineteenth century, these
ranged from sophisticated prayers for the granting of interstate rail-
road charters to the more traditional prayers for relief, especially from
veterans, war widows, and those who had been harmed in some deal-
ing with the government.35 2
At the state level, petitions also played important roles. Students of
the history of the ideology of states' rights would do well to note, for
example, that in the late eighteenth and even into the nineteenth cen-
tury, as attitudes towards slaves and free blacks hardened in the
South, the South's state legislatures continued to entertain abolition
petitions, as well as petitions from free blacks.353 These were, of
course, the same states whose representatives were so fiery in their
denunciations of such petitions in Congress, claiming the inappropri-
ateness of abolition as a topic for the federal legislature. 354
At the private level, petitioning continued apace. Two of the most
prominent examples of the use of private petitions-ones which raised
ultimately more general public issues-were petitions for divorce and
petitions for the creation of corporations. In most states, for part of
the nineteenth century, divorce was a legislative matter, to be granted
(or not) on the petition of one party to the marriage. As the petitions
became numerous and as divorces raised issues of public morality,
351. Women petitioners had been consciously trading on that moral authority for
sometime. See Wood, Sunbury Petition, supra note 124, at 613, 619.
352. After all, because sovereign immunity requires that the government specifi-
cally allow a lawsuit, where that waiver has not been granted, only a private bill can
settle matters. Christine Desan argues that the legislature had long adjudicated the
monetary demands of claimants. See Desan, supra note 19, at 1430-34. Both Lori
Finkelstein and Marcia Blaine elaborate on the significance of widows' petitions in
their work. See Marcia Blaine, War Widows: Women and the Consequences of War
(forthcoming) (on file with author); Lori Finkelstein, Cashing in on the Revolution:
Widows and Lawyers in the Early Republic (paper presented to the New York Univer-
sity Legal History Colloquium, November 12, 1997) (on file with author).
353. See, e.g., Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Cul-
ture in a Southern Town, 1784-1860 (1984); Frederika Teute Schmidt & Barbara Ripel
Wilhelm, Early Pro-slavery Petitions in Virginia, 30 Win. & Mary Q. 133 (1973);
Henry J. Reske, Following Slavery's Legal Trail: History Professor Finds Untold Sto-
ries in the Records of Southern Courthouses, ABA J., Aug. 1994, at 38,38 (1994) ("The
2,150 petitions to legislatures.., focus on changing laws to improve control of or to
free slaves.").
354. Petitions for reform of state institutions also continued apace. See, e.g.,
Marilyn S. Blackwell & James M. Holway, Reflections on Jacksonian Democracy and
Militia Reform: The Waitsfield Militia Petition of 1836, 55 Vt. Hist. 5 (1987) (discuss-
ing working class attempts at militia reform in Vermont).
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family structure, and the like, divorce became the subject of general
statutes to be administered by the courts.3 5
Similarly, to obtain a corporate charter, corporators were required,
until the advent of more general incorporation laws-laws which
came on the books in fits and starts and in a piecemeal fashion-to
petition state legislatures for the charter sought. As with divorce,
both the volume of the particular petitions and the issues of political
economy and legislative corruption raised by the petitions pushed the
states to prohibit individual charter grants and to make incorporation
an administrative matter. 6
Petitioning did not die. General subject matter petitions-political
petitions-were transformed from instruments that were parts of the
deliberative process to, in their nadir, marginal instruments of mass
politics, often fringe politics. 35 7 "Impeach Earl Warren" was not just a
screed for billboards, it was also the introduction to a sustained peti-
tion drive in the late twentieth century. Private petitions continued to
serve private needs though. As we have seen, in sufficient and regular
numbers, they took over for the older form of public petition, though
only indirectly-that is, by their presence, not their prayers-raising
issues of public concern. Petitions for public grievances were taken
less seriously, of course, but then they were taken less seriously by
both signatories and legislators. Other vehicles better suited public
grievances in a changed political culture. Also, with the change in the
formal appearance of petitions and the decline of deference, it became
more difficult to distinguish petitions from political speech gener-
ally-and, it mattered less to do so. 358
355. See Richard H. Chused, Private Acts in Public Places: A Social History of
Divorce in the Formative Era of American Family Law 109-24 (1994); Buckley, supra
note 124, at 33 & n.12.
356. See, e.g., John W. Cadman, Jr., The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and
Politics, 1791-1875 (1949).
357. For a powerful example of how the right was understood, with little compre-
hension of its history and meaning, see Citizens' Petition for the Redress of Grievances:
Hearing on S. Res. 94 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. (1955).
358. One of the great ironies of petition's jurisprudence comes from the McDonald
case, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), which has been criticized for not prop-
erly understanding the history of the right to petition. The criticism amounts to the
claim that petitions historically enjoyed greater protection than speech or press. See
generally Schnapper, supra note 3 (arguing that the historical analysis in McDonald is
flawed); Smith, Shall Make No Law, supra note 3 (suggesting that McDonald misun-
derstood the history and purpose of the right to petition and placed inappropriate
limitations on this right). While that claim is true, of course, it also ignores the in-
dependent expansion of the protection of speech and press. Moreover, had historical
understandings been fully extended, the plaintiff would have had his claim dismissed
by the trial court at the outset. Mr. McDonald's "petitions" were not actually peti-
tions at all, but rather letters to President Reagan (copied to others). In the language
of classic petitioning, they had no "petitionary parts." See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 479,
Pi's Ex. A, Pl.'s Ex. B, in J.A. at 8, 14. Indeed, though not necessarily dispositive, one
of the letters even refers to the documents as "letters" and not petitions. Id. at 14.
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D. A Cross-Cultural Note
Americans fondly seek a particular and peculiar uniqueness in their
political history. Comparative history serves to define the parameters
of topics that were uniquely within a country's political culture and
those which were not. Petitioning's transformation was not a phe-
nomenon limited to the United States. Britain's experience with peti-
tions in the nineteenth century belies the claim that slavery alone
explains the changes in petitioning in that era. Rather, Britain's expe-
rience also suggests that petitioning and the right to petition changed
as a liberal conception of politics came to replace the political culture
that preceded it.
Britain, too, witnessed a mid-nineteenth century petition contro-
versy. As did American abolitionists, British radicals seized upon pe-
titions as their instrument.359 British radicals sought both political and
economic reform, egalitarian objects as charged in Britain as abolition
was in the United States. Moreover, the volume of petitions in Britain
was proportionally similar to that in the United States. 360 In both
cases, the number of petitions was in the thousands, the number of
signatures, of course, a large multiple of that number. Britain, also,
implemented limits on petitions, though Britain's gag rule limited de-
bate, not reception.3 61 Where the United States contravened the
right, Britain did not. British radicals consciously adopted mass peti-
tioning for legislative redress of large political grievances. In the nine-
teenth century, the petition served those political ends well,
demonstrating powerful electoral support on key issues such as public
health and sanitation, Sabbath laws, and the like. 6 British restric-
tions on the right to petition heralded not petition's demise, but its
contextual historical transformation.
CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, both Britain and the United States trans-
formed their political cultures. America and Britain, societies charac-
terized by mixed organic and liberal political cultures in the
Lest anyone think such formalisms are mere excresences of the past, consider Torres
v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that failing to specify the
parties to the appeal as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), barred
the petitioner's appeal).
359. See Leys, supra note 46, at 47; Robert L. Nicholls, Surrogate for Democracy:
Nineteenth Century British Petitioning, 5 Md. Hist. 43, 44-47 (1974).
360. See Leys, supra note 46, at 47, 54, 57 (compiling British data); Robert P. Lud-
lum, The Antislavery 'Gag-Rule'. History and Argument, 26 J. Negro Hist. 203, 222-43
(1941) (reviewing the debate over the number of signatures); Nicholls, supra note 359,
at 46 (same).
361. See Nicholls, supra note 359, at 45 ("In 1842, they suceeded in imposing a gag
rule, which provided that a petition could be debated only in case of extreme
emergency.").
362. Id. at 51.
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eighteenth century, became the paradigmatic liberal societies in the
nineteenth. Extended franchise (more dramatically in Britain), disso-
lution of organic bonds (more dramatically in the United States), and
massive economic transformation were hallmarks of this shift.
With an extended franchise, accompanied by a greater degree of
actual representation, came a decreased need to make one's views
known to unrepresentative representatives. The vote became the
master. Moreover, as the market made occupational and local loyal-
ties ever more tenuous, the structure of political loyalties and politics
changed. Mass politics was on the rise. Petitioning fell victim not to
the tensions of slavery-one can easily imagine that the House could
have altered its procedure and sent petitions to a stacked committee,
there to die, as did Parliament-but to a political culture in which
deference and obligation were no longer hallmarks. 63 For their im-
portance, petitions depended on the petitioners' belief that they
would be heard. The mass petitions of a few lines belie that under-
standing. Indeed, in both countries, such petitions were consciously
made instruments of agitation, not deliberation. Conversely, those
who received the petitions well understood that change in the game of
politics and they already knew the importance of the issues raised,
such as slavery. Therefore, they also knew that any obligation to de-
liberate upon each petition no longer obtained.' Paradoxically,
therefore, liberalism, with its emphasis on the universal franchise, thus
helped to deprive those with a vote of a participating voice, not only
because those with a vote were more closely represented and because
more were actually represented, but also because the vote's only re-
ciprocal obligation was, theoretically, to be responsive-a matter of
some difficulty to determine in practice. 36  Petitioning, conceived of
as a right with real political content, had a role in a more organic
society. Petitioning, now in its public guise just another electoral tool,
had a more limited role in a liberal one. As political culture changed,
363. That petition's transformation was not a result of the gag rule controversy spe-
cifically, or the abolition movement generally, becomes clearer when one asks a ques-
tion that would have been second nature in the nineteenth century, but would be far
less so in the late twentieth century: How could a ban on reception of petitions by the
Houses of Congress stifle the right at the state level? The answer, of course, is that it
could not and did not. Constitutional culture comprehended the states as well as the
federal government-state constitutions embodied the right as well as the First
Amendment. Thus, something else, something deeper, was at work in constitutional
politics.
364. Any such obligation would lead to chaos in a system of mass politics. One can
imagine lobbying efforts so great, resulting in patterns of submission so large, that the
only conceivable object of the efforts would be to tax congressional staffs to the
breaking point.
365. As if to emphasize just how tentative reciprocal obligations in modem liberal
politics are, modem administrative law schemes require by statute that commentators
on proposed regulations receive responses, since organic bonds and electoral power
have little place in a bureaucractic state. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
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the included were no longer every person to some degree, but only the
enfranchised, now formally equal.
Notes & Observations
